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"It is important that we allow children to exercise self-
determination in treatment situations whenever their ca-
pacities, the circumstances, and the law allow it. But it
is just as important that we not burden them with deci-
sions that may have far-reaching implications for their
lives in those cases in which they do not appear to have
the capacity to address the decisions meaningfully. "1
In a winter 2004 edition of the New York Times Sunday magazine,
"The Ethicist," Randy Cohen, responded to a letter written by a medical
student on a pediatrics rotation. 2 The letter writer expressed dismay that
after diagnosing an eleven-year-old boy with leukemia, the patient's par-
ents refused to reveal the child's diagnosis to the child. 3 The impression
left by the letter was that the healthcare providers acted in accordance
with the wishes of the parents and withheld information about diagnosis
from their patient who would continue to receive outpatient treatment at
the healthcare facility. The letter writer queried whether the child had a
"right to know his diagnosis."'4 In his response, Cohen recognized that
the law supported the parents and not the healthcare provider in these
circumstances and also acknowledged a child's ethical, if not legal, enti-
tlement to be treated in accordance with his emerging cognitive capacity.
Cohen wrote, "if the parents remain obdurate [after attempts by the
healthcare provider and others to get them to reveal the diagnosis to the
child], the doctor should do what's best for the patient."'5
Though it is not exactly clear what Cohen imagined would happen
if the healthcare providers acted on their ethical obligation to do what
was best for the patient, even in the face of parental conflicts, the fact
that the question was asked highlights ongoing conflicts in the law's han-
dling of young people accessing healthcare. The law's treatment of mi-
nors in the healthcare context has been scattered and contradictory,
I Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors' Consent to Treatment: A Developmental
Perspective, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412, 425 (Aug. 1978).
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reflecting the pull of competing forces including concern for the welfare
of inexperienced young people, respect for a parent's fundamental right
to the care and custody of a child, fear of the spread of communicable
diseases by young people who avoid healthcare, and preservation of the
state's role in protecting vulnerable populations. 6 In the healthcare con-
text, the law has traditionally erred on the side of protecting young peo-
ple from themselves and from those who would do them harm by
withholding certain rights from adolescents and vesting most decision-
making authority in parents or other guardians. For the most part, with
important exceptions, people under the age of eighteen may not make
binding decisions about their own medical care.
The law as it pertains to adolescents and healthcare reflects the di-
lemma of a nation that is at once afraid of and afraid for its young peo-
ple. A collective sense of adolescents as incapable and incompetent
regularly clashes with a begrudging acknowledgment that young people
can and do engage in decidedly unchild-like activities and then face con-
sequences that require adult-like decision-making with or without the
guidance of trusted adults. The law's role, then, is to determine the best
way to ensure that young people get the support that they need and want
in order to make individualized decisions about their own best interest.
This article queries whether the law inappropriately deprives adoles-
cents of the right to participate in and potentially direct their own health-
care.7 I argue that the broad withholding of healthcare decision-making
rights from adolescents is morally unfounded and practically unnecessary
and that the age marker dividing childhood from adulthood for purposes
of healthcare decision-making has been set too high. Evidence of adoles-
cent cognitive abilities requires a re-imagining of the appropriate balance
between over and under protection of young people in the law. In choos-
6 U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, Adolescent Health-Volume III: Cross-Cut-
ting Issues in the Delivery of Health and Related Services, Consent and Confidentiality in
Adolescent Health Care Decisionmaking OTA-H-467 123 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, June 1991), available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/
byteserv.prl/-ota/disk 1/1991/9104/910406.PDF.
7 Limiting the discussion in this article to the context of healthcare is not meant to
suggest that the ideas shared here could not be equally applied to the other contexts in which
the law treats young people in a paternalistic fashion, sometimes to their benefit and at other
times to their detriment. Instead, I limit my focus for reasons both pragmatic and personal.
First, healthcare is a uniquely personal and critical domain in which the stakes can be ex-
tremely high, making it a highly charged and important topic of debate. Second, healthcare is
an arena in which the dilemmas confronting adolescents and adults are often identical. This
provides a good base from which to compare the consequences of treating one group differ-
ently than another. Third, a body of research and scholarly comment contending with some of
the questions with which I grapple here already exists, allowing for arguments grounded in
both theory and practice. Fourth, by limiting the discussion to healthcare, the proposal focuses
on a deliberate and thoughtful expansion of the law rather than a wholesale shift in all con-
texts. Ultimately, the idea of shifting the law to recognize the lived experiences of adolescents
is a worthwhile project to pursue in many other arenas.
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ing the chronological age marker of eighteen, the law denies rights to
fourteen to seventeen-year-old adolescents who are generally capable of
exercising such rights in a thoughtful fashion.
Though chronological age is an imprecise measure that does not do
justice to the intricacies and variations of individual cognitive develop-
ment, this article does not dispute the reality that chronological age is a
useful and pragmatically necessary tool for determining a baseline pre-
sumption of competence for purposes of healthcare decision-making.
However, it is appropriate and ultimately beneficial to a variety of parties
to lower the age at which the law extends the right to make autonomous
healthcare decisions to young people facing a variety of healthcare di-
lemmas. A reduction in the age of consent for healthcare decision-mak-
ing from eighteen to fourteen in most circumstances will promote the
development of adolescent autonomy by protecting minor's inherent
right to know about their own health status and share in decision-making
about their own healthcare in consultation with a parent or other trusted
adult and healthcare providers. In a shared decision-making model as
envisioned in this article, most healthcare decisions would require the
consent of both patient and parent, rather than just parental consent, with
some necessary exceptions for particularly difficult circumstances in
which sole decision-making by the young person or parent would be
most appropriate. Such a change may improve the actual physical health
of young people by encouraging access to care and providing the psycho-
logical benefits that come from wielding some measure of power over
one's own healthcare.
Part I provides an overview of the existing healthcare-related legal
landscape for young people, including state statutes that provide limited
rights to healthcare decision-making in a small universe of cases. This
part describes the ways in which the law reinforces outdated notions of
broad adolescent incompetence while also carving out limited spaces in
which adolescents may engage in autonomous decision-making.
Part II discusses the limitations of the current system of state laws
and suggests what might be gained from more comprehensive thinking
about and legislating for adolescents. This part details the ways in which
the lack of a legally enforceable right to consent to healthcare ignores the
realities of family life, leads to a lack of family communication in some
circumstances, and discourages the creation of optimal healthcare pro-
vider-patient relationships, all of which compromises the quality of care
provided to adolescent patients. The current system has its advantages
for young people, but the system's flaws outweigh its strengths.
Part III proposes a shift in the existing hodgepodge of laws provid-
ing limited healthcare decision-making power for adolescents. I articu-
late explicit and implicit goals of healthcare emancipation statutes and
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offer a proposal for better achieving both types of goals that rests upon a
model of shared healthcare decision-making powers for parents and ado-
lescents. I suggest that an appropriate response to the shifting parameters
of adolescence and adulthood and the increasing scientific evidence of
the fluidity of these categories is a reduction in the age of consent for
healthcare decision-making to fourteen from the usual eighteen, thus al-
lowing young people to share decision-making power with their parents
or other adult caretakers in most circumstances. I envision a regime in
which the baseline assumption is that parents and adolescents between
the ages of fourteen and seventeen share decision-making responsibility
for most healthcare decisions. This regime is premised upon the idea
that adolescents have the right to know about their own healthcare status
and have the capacity to meaningfully participate in decisions about their
own healthcare even in the face of parental conflicts.
Part IV discusses the relationship between the shared decision-mak-
ing model and the constitutionally protected parental right to care and
custody that has traditionally extended to allowing parents to make
largely unfettered healthcare decisions for minor children.
I. THE LAW OF HEALTHCARE DECISION-MAKING FOR
ADOLESCENTS: CRITIQUING THE STATUS QUO
When discussing any legal system, we must remember
that the law is more than just a set of rules, procedures
and prohibitions. Law itself is rhetoric and the vision by
which community and culture are established, main-
tained, and transformed.8
The law has evolved as lawmakers attempt to regulate adolescence
in a way that both respects and protects young people while granting
appropriate deference to the desire of parents to play a primary role in
determining the fate of their children. The law has progressed from
treating all children as the property of their fathers, to allowing adoles-
cents to pursue adult activities, to pursing protectionist policies that
downplay adolescent autonomy, to the current incarnation that blends
policies in order to balance between extremes. This section explores the
current terrain in which decisions about healthcare for adolescents get
made, details two purposes behind healthcare consent laws for adoles-
cents, and discusses how these purposes are and are not achieved.
8 Joan M. Smith, A Child-Centered Jurisprudence: Reconciling the Rights of Children
and Parents Within the Family, in CHILDREN AS EQUALS: EXPLORING THE RIGHTS OF THE
CHILD 146 (Kathleen Alaimo & Brian Klug eds., 2002) (citation omitted).
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A. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE AND ITS ORIGINS
For many years, with some exceptions, the law has defined adult-
hood based on chronological age with adults generally being those who
have celebrated their eighteenth birthday.9 Before reaching this point,
one is first a child and then ultimately reaches adolescence loosely de-
fined by Black's Law Dictionary as "that age which follows puberty and
precedes the age of majority."' 0 In a similarly cryptic fashion, Webster's
dictionary describes adolescence as "the time of life between puberty and
maturity; youth."'' Adolescence, then, is less of place of being as it is a
place of being in-between.12
9 Obviously, there are other significant ages, both before and after eighteen, at which
young people become privy to various adult privileges. For instance, the legal drinking age in
the states is twenty-one. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 28-1-5 (2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 4-101
(2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-47-901 (2003); FLA. STAT. § 562.11 (2003). Young people
may obtain a driver's license, with some restrictions, upon their sixteenth birthday in most
states. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 28.15.055 (Michie 2003); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. I § 16-
103 (2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.308 (West 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-12-6
(Michie 2003). Other states issue unrestricted licenses to those sixteen or older, see, e.g.,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-5-105; N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-03 (1997), or those older than sev-
enteen, see. e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-2-105.5 (2003); IDAHO CODE § 49-303 (Michie
2003). In the criminal context, most states have statutes which allow for the transfer of juve-
nile court cases to criminal courts or that allow a juvenile to be sentenced to an adult correc-
tional facility. See, e.g., Patrick Griffin, Trying and Sentencing Juveniles as Adults: An
Analysis of State Transfer and Blended Sentencing Laws, (October 2003), available at http://
www.ncjj.org. A small minority of states allows a minor to consent to marriage, without
parental permission, before the age of eighteen. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 106.010 (2003)
(young person age seventeen or older may consent to marriage); see also GA. CODE ANN.
§ 19-3-2 (2004) (young person age sixteen or older may consent to marriage); MICH. COMP.
LAWS 551.51 (young person age sixteen or older may consent to marriage); see also S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-1-100 (Law Co-op. 2003) (young person age sixteen or older may consent to mar-
riage); see also ALA. CODE § 30-1-4 (2003) (young person age fourteen or older may consent
to marriage). Some states draw a gender distinction in their marriage consent laws setting
different ages for men and women. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 123 (setting a mar-
riage age of consent at eighteen for men and sixteen for women); see also MIss. CODE. ANN.
§ 93-1-5 (2003) (setting a marriage age of consent at seventeen for men and fifteen for wo-
men). Adolescents and even younger children have been tried or sentenced as adults for par-
ticularly egregious crimes such as murder. See, e.g., Glenda Cooper, Florida Teen Gets 28
Years in Teacher's Shooting Death, WASH. POST, Jul. 28, 2001, at A03 (describing the twenty-
eight year sentence given to fourteen-year-old Nathaniel Brazill after his conviction for sec-
ond-degree murder and the automatic life sentence given to Lionel Tate after his conviction for
first-degree murder for a crime committed when he was twelve years old). For purposes of
this article, however, it is appropriate to speak of eighteen as an age with specific implications
because that is the age in the states at which a person can make broad healthcare decisions
without the knowledge or consent of a parent or other caretaker.
10 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 49 (6th ed. 1990).
I WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY & THESAURUS 9 (1996).
12 Adolescence did not come to be a distinct time of life warranting research and discus-
sion until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. NANCY LESKO, ACT YOUR AGE 110-
11 (2001). At this point, the understanding of adolescence as a state of transition became quite
entrenched. Nancy Lesko explains the ways in which the rhetorical power of the language
used to describe adolescence highlights this state of limbo. She writes:
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For most adolescents, in most circumstances, this period of being in
between leaves them stranded in the midst of a legal system in which
"even older children are permitted to decide very little for themselves."' 3
As one author explains:
While adolescent minors have more legal authority than
they used to have, for the most part they still must follow
the direction of their parents with regard to the central
features of teenage life - residence, association, and
conduct. Within the family, an uncomplicated legal re-
gime still applies, with occasional exceptions, to minors
of all ages. Parents control and provide care for their
children; children obey parental direction. In these re-
spects, the legal status of adolescents differs little from
that of all other children. Everyone under eighteen, now
the common age of majority, is lumped together as mi-
nors or, adding insult to incapacity, "infants." Their dis-
tinguishing legal characteristic is the inability to make
decisions on their own behalves. Minors are "a group of
individuals with few responsibilities, many restrictions,
and a complex legal status that maintains a dependency
on adults for privilege and access to resources."'
4
The law is not an insulated institution and it inevitably reflects the
confusion and contradictions of the larger society. Given its amorphous
status as a sort of purgatory prior to achieving adulthood, the law has
struggled to establish a means of regulating the lives of young people
that rejects inflexible presumptions of both childhood dependence and
adult independence. As the culture shifts, lawmakers re-draw the lines of
adolescence and respond to debate about the borders of adulthood.
Teenagers are "at the threshold" and in "transition to adulthood." These phrases
suggest an evolutionary arrival in an enlightened state after a lengthy period of back-
wardness. These phrases also participate in an "ideology of emergence," which is a
belief that teenagers are naturally emerging and outside of social influences. They
are autonomous beings who get dropped down into various social and historical con-
texts. "Coming of age" makes adolescence into a powerful and uncontrollable force,
like the arrival of spring that swells tree buds. Finally, "coming of age" and "at the
threshold" are also homilitic. These terms appear to give adolescence importance
but really confer greater authority on the author of the homily. Scientists and educa-
tors who proclaim the potentials and problems of the not-yet-of-age are positionally
superiors. In one or two simple and repetitious phrases we can understand the work-
ings of evolutionary progress, science, and religion.
Id. at 3.
13 Carol Sanger and Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in
Modem Times, 25 U. MICH J.L. REFORM 239, 244 (Winter 1992).
14 Id. at 244 (citation omitted).
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During the colonial period, all children were the property of their
fathers and had no true legally cognizable rights.' 5 Over time, in part
perhaps because of a dearth of legal regulation, young people enjoyed a
certain degree of autonomy and were thought of as more akin to adults
than children.16 By the early twentieth century, the law had shifted to
lumping adolescents in with children who were decisionally incapable
and in need of significant protection. 17 As the decades progressed, there
came to be a more middle-ground approach in which some areas were
more regulated than others and in which various cultural shifts preceded
shifts in the legal line between immature adolescents and mature adults.
A remarkable example of the pliability of the categories of adult and
adolescent occurred in 1971. During that year, in the midst of the tur-
moil of student protests, the war in Vietnam, changes in the educational
opportunities available and pursued by young people, and questions be-
ing asked about the appropriateness of sending young people to die in
wars when they were unable to vote, 18 Congress passed and the states
15 James Morrisey writes:
Codified law in early colonial America encompassed a "parental sovereign" ap-
proach insofar as children were concerned. Derived from seventeenth and eight-
eenth-century English law, statutes defining intrafamily relationships tended to
recapitulate prevailing European social structures, which were aristocratic and hier-
archical in form. Children had no constitutional or protective rights of their own,
and parents had almost absolute autonomy in respect to their minor offspring and
hence almost complete control.
JAMES MORRISSEY ET AL., CONSENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE OF CHILDREN
AND ADOLESCENTS 2 (1986).
16 As Heather Prescott explains:
[T]he experiences of premodern youth were substantially different from those of
modern adolescents: although the former certainly had an ambiguous social status
that encompassed parts of both childhood and adulthood, early modern youth also
enjoyed a greater flexibility of roles and larger degree of autonomy from adult super-
vision than do modem adolescents. Rather than being a "psychosocial moratorium"
from adulthood, childhood and youth were seen as periods of gradual introduction to
adult roles and responsibilities.
HEATHER MUNRO PRESCOTr, A DoCTOR OF THEIR OWN 15 (1998) (citation omitted).
17 Roger Levesque states:
In the first half of the Twentieth Century another truly fundamental change in the
image of childhood occurred, which was the "invention" of adolescence. Its inven-
tion resulted from the same forces behind the progressive, child-saving efforts. That
is, child-saving efforts contributed to adolescence being viewed not as a period close
to adulthood but rather as a part of childhood. As a result of extending children's
attributes to the post-pubescent period, laws governing infants were applied to ado-
lescents. This marked a notable change since adolescents had heretofore enjoyed
much more personal freedom. That is, adolescents, in essence, became children
under parental control and choice, and subject to adults' paternal attention.
Roger Levesque, The Internationalization of Children's Human Rights: Too Radical for Amer-
ican Adolescents, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 237, 247-48 (1994) (citations omitted).
18 See, e.g., Lowering the Voting Age to 18: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitu-
tional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 15 (1970) (statement of
Theodore E. Sorenson, Formerly Special Counsel to President Kennedy) ("To [eighteen to
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quickly ratified the Twenty-Sixth Amendment allowing those eighteen
and older to vote in all Federal elections. 9 Suddenly, eighteen, rather
than twenty-one, marked a young person as mature enough to cast a bal-
lot for a candidate of her choice illustrating the fluidity of the categories
of adult and child and the dance between law and culture. 20
Present day, the law continues to lay claim to a compromise ap-
proach with concerns about the immaturity and recklessness of young
people giving way to recognition that some life circumstances are of
such weight and significance that young people faced with these pecu-
liarly adult circumstances should be accorded adult rights with which to
deal with the personal crisis.
The jumbled approach to doling out decision-making power to ado-
lescents is powerfully illustrated by reviewing the wealth of state statutes
regulating adolescent access to various types of healthcare with or with-
out parental approval. For the most part, barring a statute such as those
described in the paragraphs that follow, parents and caretakers are the
only parties legally allowed to provide consent to healthcare for a person
under the age of eighteen.
21
In forty-eight states and the District of Columbia, the age of major-
ity, meaning the age at which a minor becomes an adult and inherits
many of the privileges and perils that come with that status, is eighteen. 22
Until this age, in the context of healthcare, state laws rest on a presump-
tion that minors are incompetent and lack the ability to make cogent,
mature, and binding decisions about their own well being.23 One com-
twenty-one-year-old soldiers,] the debate over Vietnamization, reescalation, and negotionation
is not just a matter of party politics or abstract foreign policy - it is literally a matter of life or
death. Yet they have no voice whatever in the process which determines whether they live or
die.").
19 U.S. CONST. amend XXVI.
20 Interestingly, though they have come to possess great cultural significance, the early
origins of twenty-one and eighteen as markers of adulthood were based, at least in part, on a
young man's ability to carry weapons and bear armor and not an assessment of cognitive
capacity. Lois A. Weithorn, Involving Children in Decisions Affecting Their Own Welfare, in
CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 239 (Gary B. Melton et al., eds., 1983) ("Yet, the ages
of 18 and 21 delineating majority are arbitrary and stem from currently irrelevant historical
concerns such as sufficient physical strength to bear heavy armor.").
21 Walter J. Wadlington, Consent to Medical Care for Minors, in CHILDREN'S COMPE-
TENCE TO CONSENT, supra note 20, at 59-60.
22 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.010 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-215
(West 2002); CAL. FAM. CODE § 25.1 (2002), HA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 577-1 (Michie 2002);
D.C. CODE § 46-101 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.07 (2003); LA. CIv. CODE § 29; M.C.L.S.
§ 722.4. Some exceptions to the general rule of eighteen as the age of majority are Alabama
and Nebraska where the age of majority is nineteen. ALA. CODE § 26-1-1 (2002); NEB. STAT.
§ 43-2101 (2002). In Mississippi the age of consent for medical purposes is eighteen though
the general age of majority is twenty-one. WEST'S A.M.C. §§ 41-41-3, 41-41-51.
23 The following indicates this presumption:
One rationale [for requiring parental consent to healthcare for minors] is that minors
lack the capacity to make their own health care decisions and need to be protected
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mentator summarized the law as it relates to adolescent decision-making
as follows:
Legal treatment of adolescent autonomy for medical de-
cision-making is based on a presumption of decisional
incapacity. Specifically, minors ... are presumed inca-
pable of medical decision-making. The law's presump-
tion of decisional incapacity for adolescent patients
stems from a paternalistic paradigm in existence since
the turn of the twentieth-century. . . . Underlying this
paternalistic approach to adolescence is the idea that
juveniles lack decisional capability and hence responsi-
bility and accountability attendant for their acts .... 24
The rule of parental consent is not solely based upon fears of ado-
lescent incompetence. Other rationales for the rule include "the state's
interest and families' interest in encouraging family involvement in mi-
nors' lives and health care providers' interest in being able to receive
compensation for the services they provide to minors."
25
The idea of competence to make medical decisions is a legal con-
struct requiring individualized, rather than global, assessments based on
the capacity of a given patient at a given point in medical treatment.
26
For purposes of healthcare decision-making, competence essentially re-
fers to a patient's ability to provide informed consent, meaning consent
that is offered "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." 27 Rather than
determining competence, healthcare providers have a responsibility for
evaluating a patient's decision-making capacity prior to obtaining valid
informed consent.
28
from their own improvident decisionmaking. The legal presumption that minors are
incompetent rests at least in part on an assumption of courts and legislators that
minors as a class lack the requisite capacity to make health care decisions for
themselves.
U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 6.
24 Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Decisional Autonomy for Medical Care: Health-
care Provider Perceptions and Practices, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 87, 91 (2001).
25 OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 6, at 123.
26 Id. Courts charged with determining the competence of patients making seemingly
irrational choices about life-saving treatment often turn to the testimony of mental health ex-
perts to evaluate a patient's ability to consent or refuse to consent to treatment. See, e.g., In re
Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282 (1978) (based on a short meeting with the court and the
testimony of two psychiatrists, judge found a medical "conscientious objector" competent to
refuse amputation of his gangrenous legs in spite of impending death).
27 Preston A. Britner et al., Psychology and the Law: Evaluating Juveniles' Competence
to Make Abortion Decisions: How Social Science Can Inform the Law, 5 U. CHI. L. ScH.
ROUNDTABLE 35, 40 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
28 A competence evaluation and a determination of decision-making capacity are not one
and the same. A healthcare provider who determines decision-making capacity makes a
clinical determination rather than a determination on competence, which is a legal construct.
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Issues of decision-making capacity and legal competence become
more complicated and charged when a young person is involved. The
issues are complex because the young patient is not legally required or
allowed to provide consent to care even if he is capable, willing, and
eager to give that consent or, in some circumstances, withhold consent.
Parents possess a Constitutionally protected role, subsumed within the
broad parental right to care and custody of a child, that includes making
decisions for minor children on a wide range of issues including where
they will live, what school they will attend, and what healthcare they will
receive. 29 As explained by the United States Supreme Court:
Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civ-
ilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad pa-
rental authority over minor children. Our cases have
consistently followed that course; our constitutional sys-
tem long ago rejected any notion that a child is "the
mere creature of the State" and, on the contrary, asserted
that parents generally "have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare [their children] for
additional obligations." Surely, this includes a "high
duty" to recognize symptoms of illness and to seek and
follow medical advice. The law's concept of the family
rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child
lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment
required for making life's difficult decisions. More im-
portant, historically it has recognized that natural bonds
of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of
their children.
30
Despite multiple cases throughout the decades that have directly or
indirectly posed challenges to parental authority, the Supreme Court has
held to its respect for the primacy of the parent.31 While the Court con-
tinues to re-shape the contours of parental fights as family structures
John D. Lantos & Steven H. Miles, Autonomy in Adolescent Medicine, 10 J. ADOL. HEALTH
CARE 460, 462 (Nov. 1989).
29 Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
30 Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 (1979) (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535).
31 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (declaring unconstitutional a child
visitation statute that gave courts broad discretion to award visitation with any party over the
objection of the fit custodial parent); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (declaring
unconstitutional a two parent notice requirement for those under 18 seeking an abortion);
Parham, 442 U.S. at 584 (involving a parent's ability to "voluntarily" commit a minor to a
psychiatric facility); Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (involv-
ing a state's ability to regulate minors' access to contraception).
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change and challenges to parental authority come from various corners,
32
the basic premise that parents are, in the first instance, the most appropri-
ate party to engage in decision-making on behalf of all minor children
remains at the core of family law jurisprudence. 33 As such, when a mi-
nor is in need of healthcare, it is the parent, not the patient, who must be
informed and give consent for most procedures.
34
Given the overarching legal paradigm when it comes to parents and
children, it is not surprising that the vast majority of young people who
receive healthcare during their adolescence cannot consent to that care
but must have a parent or guardian make final decisions about diagnosis
and treatment. 35 During minority, parents have not only a right, but also
a statutory responsibility to seek medical care for their children. 36 In
extreme cases, a parent may face criminal sanctions for dereliction of his
duty to provide healthcare to a child.3 7 Where the parent or guardian is
32 See, e.g., Parham, 442 U.S. at 584 (involving appropriate procedures for involuntary
commitment of young people based on consent of their parents).
33 See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66. ("In light of. . extensive precedent, it cannot now be
doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental
right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their
children.").
34 As Wadlington explains:
If it is to be binding, consent to medical treatment must be obtained from a person
who has legal capacity to give it.... Until a child reaches the legal age of majority,
is emancipated generally or is specifically empowered by legislative or judicial ac-
tion to consent to medical treatment, the child's parent or guardian usually has legal
capacity to give or withhold consent to treatment. If consent is withheld arbitrarily,
contrary to the needs of the child, a course of action may be available against the
parent under the abuse and neglect statutes; courts generally are empowered either
through such laws or under the broad scope of parens patriae jurisdiction to appoint
a guardian for the purpose of consenting to treatment of an incompetent. But with-
out consent from some competent person or agency, a physician who renders treat-
ment not falling within the exception of the emergency doctrine risks a legal action.
Wadlington, Consent to Medical Care for Minors, in Melton, supra note 21, at 59-60.
35 Heather Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, Minors and the Right to Consent to Healthcare,
THE Gu-rrMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY, Aug. 2000, at 4.
36 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-1 (2004) (defining a dependent child as one "[w]hose
parent, parents, guardian, or other custodian neglects or refuses... to provide or allow medical,
surgical, or other care necessary for the child's health or well-being); ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.10.014 (Michie 2004) ("[Tlhe court may find neglect of a child if the parent, guardian, or
custodian fails to provide the child with... medical attention... though financially able to do
so or offered financial or other reasonable means to do so."); CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 300
(2004) (dependent child is one who "has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child
will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of ... the willful or negligent failure of
the parent or guardian to provide the child with ... medical treatment .... ).
37 See, e.g., Ex parte Lucas, 792 So.2d 1169 (Ala. 2000) (involving mother indicted for
capital murder based on a failure to provide life-saving medical services for her child); Ever-
sley v. State, 784 So.2d 963 (Fla. 1999) (involving mother convicted of felony child abuse for
failure to seek out medical care for child with pneumonia who died); Woods v. State, 724
So.2d 40 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (upholding criminal conviction for father who failed to get
medical treatment for child with second-degree bums).
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so deficient in caretaking duties that he risks the health and safety of the
young person, the state may seek a finding that the child has been ne-
glected and may invoke its parens patriae power through which decision-
making for the child will shift, not to the affected young person, but to
the state. 38 Therefore, in general, a young person cannot seek a vaccina-
tion, attend an annual physical, have a cavity filled, or ask for an eye
exam without the knowledge or consent of an adult caretaker. Even the
most innocuous provision of care generally cannot legally take place
without consultation and consent from parents or caretakers.
While the baseline rule is that a healthcare provider can only pro-
vide care to an adolescent with the consent of a parent or guardian, states
have carved out a limited number of exceptions to the rule. Pregnancy is
one area in which the emergent needs of an adolescent trump concern
about parental rights and adolescent incompetence. Recognizing the se-
rious issues inherent in a decision to carry a pregnancy to term and be-
come a mother and the reluctance of some young women to talk about
these issues with parents, laws in twenty-eight states and the District of
Columbia confer limited adult status on pregnant young women. In these
states, a healthcare provider treating a pregnant adolescent who wishes to
carry her child to term is legally bound to provide prenatal care to that
young woman as though she has obtained the age of majority.39 Further.
for the most part, the treating healthcare provider has no legal obligation
38 See, e.g., Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1991) (involving state seeking a
finding of neglect against Christian Scientist parents who refused consent for chemotherapy
for a child with cancer); In re Philip B., 156 Cal.Rptr. 48 (1979) (involving state seeking a
finding of dependency where parents refused to consent to heart surgery for their child af-
flicted with Down's Syndrome); In re Helen Vasko, 238 A.D. 128 (N.Y. 1933) (involving
state seeking a finding of neglect where parents refused consent to eye surgery for their two-
year-old daughter).
39 ALA. CODE § 22-8-6 (2004); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.025 (Michie 2003); ARK. CODE
ArN. § 20-9-602 (2003); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6925 (West 2004); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 577A-2, 577A-3 (Michie 2002) (allowing for disclosure to parents at the discretion of the
healthcare provider); IDAHO CODE § 39-4302 (Michie 2004); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/1
(West 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-105 (2004); D.C. MUN. REG. § 600.7 (2004); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 743.065 (West 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-123 (2003); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 214.185 (Banks-Baldwin 2004); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 20-102 (2004); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. Ill, § 121A (2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 333.9132(1) (West
2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 (West 2004); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3 (2004); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 431.061(4) (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-402 (2003); N.J. REV. STAT.
9:17A-1 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1-13, 24-1-13.1 (Michie 2004); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2405 (McKinney 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.5 (2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 2602 (2004) (healthcare provider may disclose to parents are her discretion); 35 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 521.13, 10103 (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-229 (2004); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 32.003 (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1101 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-1969(E)(2)
(Michie 2002).
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and, in some cases, no statutory right to report the pregnancy to the pa-
tient's parent or guardian. 4°
For young women who do not wish to carry a pregnancy to term,
states may regulate access to abortion, though there are limits on how
restrictive the state may be.41 More than half of the states require a
young woman to notify a parent before getting an abortion, 42 though the
Court has required that these statutes provide a young woman with the
option of seeking a judicial bypass of the parental notification
requirement.
43
Pregnancy is only one criterion for conferring limited healthcare de-
cision-making rights on minors. In all states and the District of Colum-
bia, minors who have a sexually transmitted infection ("STI"),
specifically including human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV") in some
states and not in others, may consent to STI related treatment.44 Adoles-
40 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-105; D.C. MUN. REG. § 600.7; FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 743.065; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.185; Mo. REV. STAT. § 431.061(4); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2405; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 32.003.
41 See, e.g., Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (declaring unconstitutional a Massa-
chusetts parental consent statute without an adequate judicial bypass provision); Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (declaring unconstitutional a
Missouri parental consent requirement).
42 PLANNED PARENTHOOD, Fact Sheet Teenagers, Abortion, and Government Intrusion
Laws, available at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/library/ABORTION/laws.html (stating
that thirty-four states have laws mandating the involvement of at least one parent in abortion
decision-making unless a woman obtains judicial approval for the procedure).
43 Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 510 (1990); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 763-64 (1990).
44 ALA. CODE § 22-8-6; ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.025; ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-
132.01; ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-508 (healthcare provider may disclose information over the
objection of the patient); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6926(a); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 121010; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 39a-592 (requires parental consent unless healthcare provider
believes that parental involvement would result in non-treatment or if minor request that par-
ents not be informed); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16 § 710; D.C. MUN. REGS. § 600.7, D.C. CODE
ANN. § 7-1605 (allows for testing for HIV and healthcare provider may inform parents at her
discretion); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.30; GA. CODE. ANN. § 31-17-7(a) (healthcare provider
may disclose to parents at her discretion); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 577A-2, 577A-3 (health-
care provider may disclose at her discretion); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4302, 39-4303; 410 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 210/4 (West 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-402(4); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16-36-1-3 (Michie 2002); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 139A.35 (2002) (allows for disclosure of
HIV test results to parents); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2892; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 214.185; LA.
CIv. CODE ANN. § 40:1095 et. seq.; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1501 et. seq.; MD. CODE
ANN. HEALTH-GEN. I § 20-102; MASS. GEN. LAW ANN., ch. Ill § 117, MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 333.5127; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144,343; Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-13; Mo. REV.
STAT. § 431.06!(4); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-402; NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-504; NEV. REV.
STAT. § 129.060; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-C:18.(II) (2002) (minor must be fourteen or
older); N.J. REv. STAT. 9:17A-4 (healthcare provider may disclose at her discretion); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 24-1-9; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2305; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.5; N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-10-17; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3701.24.2; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 2602 (healthcare provider may disclose at her discretion); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.610 (2001);
35 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 10103 (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-8-1.1(2001); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 20-7-280, 290 (minor must be 16 or older); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23-17; TENN. CODE
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cents in forty-three states and the District of Columbia may make deci-
sions related to care for drug or alcohol dependency, generally without
the knowledge or consent of a parent or guardian. 45 Adolescents in need
of mental health services may seek those services without the knowledge
or consent of their parents in twenty-two states and the District of Co-
lumbia.46 Several states also have statutes providing that minors may
ANN. § 63-6-229; TEX. FAM. CODE § 32.003; UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-6-18; VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 4226 (healthcare provider must notify parent if condition requires immediate hospitaliza-
tion); VA. CODE. ANN. § 54.1-2969(E)(1) (healthcare provider may release test results to par-
ent or guardian at her discretion); WASH. REV. CODE. § 70.24.110 (minor must be fourteen or
older); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-4-10, 16-3C-2; Wis. STAT. § 252.11; Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 35-4-
131.
45 ALA. CODE § 22-8-6; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2024 (1986) (providing that a mi-
nor or her parent may apply for treatment for alcohol dependency); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-
602; CAL. FAM. CODE § 6929 (providing that a minor twelve years or older may consent to
services, provided that the healthcare provider includes parents in treatment plan, unless such
involvement would be detrimental to the child); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1-308; CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17a-682; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2210 (providing that a minor twelve or older
may consent); D.C. MUN. REG. § 600.7; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.499-94.4995; GA. CODE.
ANN. § 37-7-8; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 577-26; IDAHO CODE § 39-307; 410 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 210/4 (West 2002); IoWA CODE ANN. § 125.33 (West 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65-2892a; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.185; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1095; ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1501, 1502-A (West 1995); MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. I § 20-102;
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12E (West 2004); MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 333.6121;
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343; Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-14 (providing that minor must be
fifteen or older); Mo. REV. STAT. § 431.061(4); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 41-1-402; NEV. REV.
STAT § 129.050 (requiring healthcare provider to "make every reasonable effort to report the
fact of treatment to the parent"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318-B:12-a (requiring minor to be
twelve years or older); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17A-4 (providing that healthcare provider may
inform parents at her discretion); N.Y. MENTAL HYo. LAW § 22.11 (McKinney 1999); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-21.5; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-17; OH. REV. CODE ANN. § 3719.012; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2602 (providing that a healthcare provider may inform parents at its
discretion); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.675 (providing that minor must be fourteen or older and
healthcare provider must involve the parents); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1690.112 (provid-
ing that healthcare provider may notify parents at her discretion); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-5-3,
14-5-4 (requiring parental consent unless it will negatively impact treatment); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 20-7-280, 20-7-290 (providing that minor must be sixteen or older); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 34-20A-50; TENN. CODE § 63-6-229; TEX. FAM. CODE § 32.003; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18
§ 4226 (requiring a healthcare provider to notify parent if condition requires immediate hospi-
talization); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2969(E)(3); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 70.86A.235,
13.32A.030 (providing that minor must be thirteen or older and parents may be notified with
consent of minor or if healthcare provider deems it necessary); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 51.47 (pro-
viding that minor must be twelve or older).
46 ALA. CODE § 22-8-6; ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-9-602; CAL. FAM. CODE § 6924(b) (pro-
viding that minor twelve years or older may consent but healthcare provider must notify par-
ents unless to do so would be detrimental); GA. CODE. ANN. § 37-3-20(a); IDAHO CODE § 39-
4302; 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-501 (West 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-103;
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-682; D.C. MuN. REO. § 600.7; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.459;
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.185; MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 20-102; MIcH. COMP
LAWS ANN. § 330.1707(1) (must be fourteen or older); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:12
(2004) (providing that minor may only consent to treatment in a state-run facility); N.M. AD-
MIN. CODE § 7.20.11.7 (minor must be fourteen or older); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-32; OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.04 (minor must be fourteen or older); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.675(2),
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make their own healthcare decisions when faced with an emergency. 47 A
small number of states allow minors who have been sexually assaulted to
consent to care related to the assault.
48
The law of emancipation is another area in which the law manipu-
lates the boundary between adolescence and adulthood. Statutory eman-
cipation is a mechanism by which a small sub-class of adolescents seeks
legal relief from the disability of their minority.49 Through this process,
"minors attain legal adulthood before reaching the age of majority," 50
thereby assuming the power to: sign binding contracts, own property,
keep their earnings, and disobey their parents. Although under eighteen,
they are "considered as being over the age of majority" in most of their
dealings with parents and third parties. Thus, while emancipated minors
can sign contracts and stay out late, their adult status also means that
their parents are no longer responsible for the minors' support. 5'
A young person can obtain statutory emancipation in at least two
ways, either through a court order or automatically pursuant to a statute.
A minor can seek a court order of emancipation when she is living inde-
pendently, thereby evidencing the capacity to function without parental
resources, monetary and otherwise. 52 Statutes contemplate that minors
who seek a court order of emancipation will establish a level of maturity
that justifies their overnight transformation into legal adults although it is
not clear that this showing is always made or required by decision-
makers. 5
3
109.680 (minor must be fourteen or older); PA. STAT. § 7201 (2002) (minor must be fourteen
or older and healthcare provider must notify parents); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-229; TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 32.003; VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2969(E)(4) (Michie 2004); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 71.34.030 (minor must be thirteen or older).
47 ALA. CODE § 22-8-3; ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2271, 44-132; 405 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/3-504; 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 210/3; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 707; KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 65-2891; MIsS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-7; Mo. REV. STAT. § 431.061; MONT.
CODE. ANN. § 41-1-402; NEV. REv. STAT. § 129.040; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135:21-b; N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-10-17.1; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 2602; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-
9-4.2 (specifically does not apply to elective abortion, sterilization, or birth control).
48 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 70/5; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 §§ 1501, 1507; MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 20-102; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17A-4.
49 Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 13, at 240.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 240-41.
52 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 26-13-1, 26-13-2, 26-13-4, 26-13-6 (providing that a minor
may be emancipated with leave of the court); CAL. F m. CODE § 7002; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 30/3-1, 30/3-2, 30/4, 30/5 (providing that a minor may be emancipated with leave of the
court); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.341 (allowing emancipation for minors who are living inde-
pendently); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-59.1 (2003) (providing that a minor may be emancipated
with leave of the court).
53 In a small study of emancipation petitions filed and approved over a two-year period
Sn a California county, the authors recount rapid hearing procedures that lacked rigor and
during which judges often failed to conduct a more than cursory review of the petitioner's
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Second, other minors are emancipated by statute based on status,
rather than any requirement of establishing maturity and independence
through a court proceeding. 54 In twenty-four states, certain categories of
minors, typically those who are married, pregnant, parents, or in the
armed services, are considered emancipated based on that status alone
and may make independent decisions about general medical services. 55
Oddly enough, in some states, a young woman may be able to make
healthcare decisions for her child that she could not make for herself
without parental approval.
Emancipation provides a young person with broad, though not total,
relief from the disabilities of age. For instance, the California statute
grants adult-status to minors only in the following areas:
consenting to medical care; entering contracts; suing and
being sued; ending parental support; controlling earn-
ings; establishing a residence; dealing in real property;
obtaining a work permit; ending parental vicarious lia-
bility; enrolling in school; owning stock; buying insur-
ance; making a will or an estate plan; creating or
revoking a trust; and authorizing other probate and es-
tate-related activities.
56
satisfaction of the statutory requirements of independent living, financial responsibility, and
voluntariness. Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 13, at 284-89.
54 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8-4 (2002) (providing that minor must be fourteen or older
and must be a high school graduate, married or pregnant); ALASKA REV. STAT. § 25.20.025;
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-602; CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6911, 6922 (providing that minor must be
living apart from parents and must manage his or her own financial affairs); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 743.064 & 743.0645; IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4302, 39-4303; 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 210/1
(West 2002) (providing that minor must be married, a parent themselves, or have parental
consent); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-1-3(a) (Michie 2002) (providing that minor must be eman-
cipated, married, divorced, in the military, authorized by statute, or fourteen or older and living
away from parents); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-123b (requiring minor to be sixteen or older); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.185; MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 20-102; MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 41-41-3 (providing that minor must have intelligence to understand procedure and its conse-
quences); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-402 (providing that minor must be married, pregnant, a
high school graduate, emancipated, living apart from parents, and financially self-supporting if
the health care is for minor's child); NEV. REv. STAT. § 129.030 (providing that minor must be
living apart from parents for four months, married or been married, a mother, in danger of a
serious health hazard, or able to understand the nature, purpose, and need for medical care and
voluntarily request the care); N.J. REV. STAT. 9:17A-4 (providing that a healthcare provider
may inform parents at its discretion); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.640 (providing that minor must be
fifteen or older and the healthcare provider must involve the parents); 28 PA. CODE § 27.97;
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.6-1 (providing that minor must be sixteen or older, married, or a par-
ent); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-280; TENN. CODE § 63-6-229; VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2969(A)-
(B) (requiring a court order); Wvo. STAT. § 14-1-101(b) (providing that minor must be legally
married, on active duty in the military, treatment need must be urgent, and parents or guardian
cannot be located, or minor must be living apart from parents and managing her own affairs).
55 See id.
56 Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 13, at 259 (citing CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 63, 63.1, &
63.2).
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Therefore, for the purpose of legally buying or consuming alcohol
or obtaining a driver's license, emancipation based on status or court
order may not confer adult status on an emancipated minor.57 However,
an emancipated minor, whether emancipated by court order or by statute,
is freed from an obligation to confer with parents or seek their consent on
healthcare choices and bears financial responsibility for those choices.
In addition to or in place of statues, some state courts invoke the
common law mature minor doctrine to evaluate a minor's right to make
healthcare decisions. The mature minor doctrine provides a seldom-used
mechanism for circumventing the need for parental consent when a court
determines that a young person is capable of making a healthcare deci-
sion with which his parents, healthcare provider, or the state may not
agree. 58 The mature minor doctrine "holds that if a minor is of sufficient
intelligence and maturity to understand and appreciate both the benefits
and risks of the proposed medical or surgical treatment, then the minor
may consent to that treatment without parental consent, other issues...
not withstanding. '59 Importantly, adolescents adjudicated to be mature
minors
differ from emancipated minors in that they are living at
home, are not contributing to room and board, or are not
parents themselves, married, or members of the armed
forces; they are the most typical adolescents. The basis
of their authority to consent derives from the develop-
mental maturation of cognition, not from life-style sta-
tus, as for emancipated minors, or age, as for those who
have achieved majority.
60
57 See id. at 259-59.
58 The Illinois Supreme Court confronted the issue of mature minors when a seventeen-
year-old Jehovah's Witness stricken with leukemia refused blood transfusions that were a nec-
essary component of treatment for her terminal illness. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 325 (Ill.
1989). In finding that a young woman only six months shy of her eighteenth birthday and who
the record indicated was quite mature could refuse life-saving treatment, the court wrote
"[a]lthough the age of majority in Illinois is 18, that age is not an impenetrable barrier that
magically precludes a minor from possessing and exercising certain rights normally associated
with adulthood." Id. Similarly, the Tennessee Supreme Court adopted a mature minor excep-
tion as part of the state's common law where a seventeen-year-old woman consented to care
by an osteopath that resulted in injuries to her back. See Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739
(Tenn. 1987). The court wrote, "[w]e hold that the mature minor exception is part of the
common law of Tennessee. Its application is a question of fact for the jury to determine
whether the minor has the capacity to consent to and appreciate the nature, the risks, and the
consequences of the medical treatment involved." Id. at 749; see also In re Swan, 569 A.2d
1202 (Me. 1990) (allowing parents to effectuate the desire of a seventeen-year-old in a persis-
tent vegetative state to end artificial nutrition).
59 MORRISSEY ET AL., supra note 15, at 43.
60 Id.
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Application of the mature minor doctrine does not depend on the
nature of the young person's ailment 6' though some opine that it would
not be applied to "non-beneficial care, including tissue donation, particu-
larly when complex issues and significant risks are involved which could
be difficult for any patient to appreciate. '62 Furthermore, application of
the doctrine does not require that the young person has reached any spe-
cific age though it is generally applicable to older adolescents.
63 Signifi-
cantly, the application of the mature minor doctrine, in allowing for
individualized assessment of a young person's decision-making capacity,
is based "on a rejection of the presumption of minors' incompetency and
the underlying assumption that minors as a class lack decisionmaking
capacity." 64
Based on current law, while most adolescents seeking care from a
healthcare provider will need to do so with the consent and knowledge of
their parents, certain limited categories of young people-generally those
who have or suspect that they have an STI, are pregnant, need drug or
alcohol treatment, mental healthcare services or who have been emanci-
pated by court order or statute-may seek healthcare on the same basis
as adults. One commentator has decried the inadequacy of this "patch-
work quilt of rights and limitations" creating an incongruous situation in
which "[a] teenage mother must give consent before her baby may be
treated, but, by and large, is not permitted to consent to her own health
care. An adolescent boy can be tested and treated for HIV without pa-
rental involvement, but his parents must consent to setting his broken
leg."65
B. UNDERSTANDING THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE
The statutes and doctrines creating a web of exceptions to the idea
of broad adolescent decisional incompetence in the context of healthcare
further at least two categories of goals: one practical and the other ethi-
cal. The practical goal is a public health one that seeks to stem the
spread of communicable diseases, decrease rates of untreated drug or
alcohol addiction, and allow access to other stigmatized treatment such
as pregnancy related care for a young woman by encouraging young peo-
ple to access care in circumstances that might lead to a failure to receive




64 OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 6, at 127.
65 Michelle Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, 24 J. L. MED. & ETmics 127, 127
(1996).
66 Jennifer Rosato, Let's Get Real: Quilting a Principled Approach to Adolescent Em-
powerment in Health Care Decision-Making, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 769, 778 (2002) ("[T]he
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jurisdictions legislating on the issue of STIs indicates, fear of driving
potentially infectious, sexually active young people away from care that
could be curative helped push many legislators to pass laws giving mi-
nors significant freedom in deciding the course of their STI-related
health care.6
7
One commentator rationalized the existence of healthcare emanci-
pation statues as "reflect[ing] a public consensus that ensuring minors'
access to the given treatment outweighs parental interests in controlling
the care a child receives. The focus of such exceptions rests not on an
assessment of maturity, but on a calculus that grants minors autonomy
only when the treatment is relatively low-risk, and when denying access
may cause the minor (or the public at large) to suffer permanent harm."'68
In addition to personal risk, there are larger societal consequences to
which these healthcare emancipation statutes respond. Substance abuse
has a significant societal cost in the form of crime, incarceration, loss of
productive citizens, and the need for healthcare and rehabilitation. 69 By
making sure that young people have access to confidential care, society
protects its interest in the health of its citizens and its financial interest in
the public health. Similarly, teenage pregnancy and STI transmission
have an identifiable and quantifiable societal cost, both financial and oth-
erwise, as young women with, at best, only high school educations and
largely limited resources give birth to children whom they will struggle
to support. At the same time, young people with STIs burden the public
health system when disease spreads unchecked ultimately causing unnec-
basic rationale of [status based exceptions to the rule of parental consent] is that the cost of a
minor failing to seek treatment is greater than the state's desire to involve parents in their
child's health care decision-making."); Tomas J. Silber, Ethical Considerations in Caring for
Adolescents, 10 PEDIArmic ANNALS 408, 409 (1981) ("[M]any adolescents who need access to
medical care in order to better protect their health would never consult a doctor if they knew
he would require parental consent prior to treatment.").
67 Michelle Oberman explains the advent of statutes allowing minors to consent to STI
related care as follows:
During [the 1960s], growing evidence suggested that sexual activity among teenag-
ers was relatively commonplace, and that, because they could not consent to care on
their own, teenagers' health status was in jeopardy. Specifically, it became increas-
ingly evident that an epidemic of sexually transmitted diseases was spreading among
unemancipated teenagers. This public health concern, coupled with a fear that teens
would not seek treatment for these communicable conditions if their parents had to
be notified of-let alone give consent for-such treatment, led states to pass "minor
treatment statutes."
Oberman, supra note 65, at 130.
68 Id. at 131.
69 One source indicates that wide-ranging societal costs of substance abuse explaining
that "untreated substance abuse increases the cost of every state's criminal justice system;
Medicaid; child welfare; juvenile justice; and mental health systems, totaling $77.9 billion
dollars in 1998." HAZELDEN FOUNDATION, Social and Criminal Impact (Sept. 1998), available
at http://www.hazelden.org/servlet/hazelden/cms/ptt/hazl-7 (citing CASA Study).
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essary outbreaks and epidemics, creating a larger pool of individuals in
need of treatment. 70 Thus, society has already made determinations that
young people should be granted a right to autonomous decision-making
where the failure to make a decision may have serious societal conse-
quences. In contrast, where the benefit is a more individual one, the law
has been slower to respond to the needs of young people.
The end result is that many healthcare emancipation statutes best
serve a practical purpose that reflects not an assessment of maturity, but
a need to protect minors from the adverse consequences of their own
fear, unfounded or not, of parental repercussions. 71 Importantly, these
statutes are not steeped in particular beliefs about adolescent capacity for
decision-making.
Advocates who, during the height of the sexual revolution of the
1960s, pushed for the passage of statutes that provided limited consent
rights to adolescents seeking care for STIs,
avoided using terminology that condoned sexual free-
dom among teenagers. Instead, the legislation was
framed in terms of a "least harm" perspective, which jus-
tified removing parental consent barriers because doing
so would protect young people from the consequences of
their sexual behavior. The more fundamental issue of
whether young people in general, and young women in
particular, had the right to make reproductive decisions
independently of their parents was carefully avoided,
possibly because advocates feared that using a "repro-
ductive rights" argument would make their cause even
more controversial than it already was. For example,
statues permitting minors to obtain treatment for sexu-
ally transmitted diseases without parental consent were
aimed at preserving the public health and protecting the
minor from the health risks associated with sexual
intercourse, not at increasing the minor's self-
determination.
72
70 A report from the Alan Guttmacher Institute estimates that "the total estimated cost of
the nine million cases that occurred among fifteen to twenty-four year-olds in 2000 is $6.5
billion." Harrell W. Chesson, et al., The Estimated Direct Cost of Sexually Transmitted Dis-
ease Among American Youth 2000, 36 PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH, 11, 15
(2004). While rates of teenage pregnancy have been in a steady decline, those young women
who do experience pregnancy are more likely to drop out of high school and live in poverty,
and their offspring will often experience various "health and developmental problems."
PLANNED PARENTHOOD, Fact Sheet-Reducing Teen Pregnancy-Pregnancy & Childbearing
Among U.S. Teens (December 1999), available at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/library/
TEEN-PREGNANCY/teenpreg-fact.html.
71 Oberman, supra note 65, at 131.
72 PREscorr, supra note 16, at 157.
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Though the rhetoric behind these statutes gave little credence to the
idea of adolescent self-determination, it is clear that advocates for young
people, particularly as they pursued cases in the courts, recognized the
benefit of framing their positions in terms of adolescent rights. For in-
stance, in Carey v. Population Services International, decided in 1977,
the Supreme Court, while admitting reluctance to "define 'the totality of
the relationship of the juvenile and the state,"73 described adolescents as
important rights-bearers, reiterating earlier contentions that "[m]inors, as
well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitu-
tional rights."'74 While the case struck down a New York statute restrict-
ing access to contraceptives to those under sixteen, the Court specifically
declined to speak to the question of what level of Constitutional protec-
tion for private and consensual sexual conduct existed for adolescents or
adults.75 Even in making these judgments, the Court did not focus on the
issue of adolescent capacity for thoughtful decision-making to ground its
determination that young people should have access to contraceptives.
The preceding discussion should not diminish the importance of the
public health purpose that appears to have been a motivating force be-
hind some adolescent healthcare emancipation statutes. However, in an
ever-evolving world, it is wise to reflect on what other loftier and per-
haps more intangible ethical goals, not explicitly a part of earlier cam-
paigns, might be served in the present. While it may not have been
prudent to speak in terms of adolescent capacity or autonomy during pre-
vious eras, there is value in re-evaluating the underlying premises of such
laws, explicit and implicit, and ascertaining whether an evolving world
and expanding knowledge can breathe new life into old statutes. In that
vein, it is prudent to speak to the importance of autonomy and respect for
decision-making capacity as a cornerstone principle of the provision of
healthcare for young and old.
Part of the ethical analysis of how healthcare is provided focuses on
the extent to which a patient's autonomy is protected and respected. 76
Applying an autonomy analysis to the healthcare provided to an adoles-
cent who cannot consent to her own care, one must "reject[ ] the formu-
lation that the adolescent is being protected [and i]nstead . . . view[ ] the
insistence on parental consent as a denial of the adolescent's rights as a
person, separate from his parents. '77
73 Carey, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977) (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 13 (1967)).
74 Id. at 692 (citing Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74
(1976)).
75 Id. at 695.
76 Silber, supra note 66, at 409.
77 Id.
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The personal autonomy at issue in this context refers to "[t]he realm
of inviolable sanctuary most of us sense in our own beings. '78 Personal
autonomy, as manifested in the healthcare context by requiring informed
consent, is widely understood to be of enormous value and benefit to
individuals. As one philosopher has noted, "Whatever else we mean by
autonomy ... it must be a good and admirable thing to have, not only in
itself but for its fruits-responsibility, self esteem, and personal dignity.
Autonomy so conceived is not merely a 'condition,' but a condition to
which we aspire as an ideal."'79
While debates have raged in philosophy and law about the meaning
or usefulness of autonomy, particularly when the concept is subjected to
critique based on gender or age,80 for purposes of this article, I assume
that autonomy is overall a good thing and that it embraces the notion that
"[t]he autonomous person, as the saying goes, is 'his own man' or 'her
own woman.' He/she doesn't 'belong' to anyone else, either as property
or as possession. Anyone who would deal in her affairs must come to
terms with her, or her agent. It will not do to negotiate only with her
parents or her boss, and she has no 'keeper.'"81
This is not to say, however, that an autonomous individual is with-
out connection, community, or allegiance. As recognized by many femi-
nist theorists, one of the myths of autonomy is the insistence by some
that dependence is the antithesis of an autonomous existence. 82 Martha
Fineman explains:
[A]utonomy is often presented as a state of being that is
attainable by all. It is also perceived as an individually
(and autonomously) developed characteristic that ulti-
78 See Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL-EsSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL Au-
TONOMY 27 (John Christman ed., 1989).
79 Id. at 31.
80 See MARILYN FRIEDMAN, Autonomy and Its Discontents, in AUTONOMY, GENDER,
POLITICS 30-55 (2003) (describing and responding to various criticisms of autonomy); see
generally RELATIONAL AUTONOMY (Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000) (col-
lection of feminist essays critiquing traditional notions of autonomy and embracing the notion
of relational autonomy).
81 Feinberg, supra note 78, at 31.
82 MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH (2004). One advocate for children
explains:
Dependency should not be a reason to be deprived of choice and respect. An impor-
tant contribution of feminist moral theory has been to question the firmly embedded
assumption that moral agency and citizenship rights require a person to be indepen-
dent, totally autonomous. Feminists, such as Carol Gilligan in In A Different Voice
and Marilyn Friedman, have questioned this deeply held assumption. It is, they ar-
gue, derived from a specifically male experience of social relations which values
competition and solitary achievement. It is inappropriately individualistic. Depen-
dence is a basic human condition. We have all been dependent and many of us have
passed through phases of dependency or will do so.
MICHAEL FREEMAN, THE MORAL STATUS OF CHILDREN 73 (1997).
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mately reflects the worth (or lack thereof) of the person.
In this simplistic version of autonomy, the realities
of... dependency are absent. In fact, the world that this
vision of autonomy imagines is a world that can only be
populated by adults, and then only by those adults pos-
sessing sufficient capabilities and competencies to make
it possible that their only demand of government (aside
from the provision of security and courts of law) be for
rules that guarantee their right to be left alone to realize
the gains and glory their individual talents may
bring. . . [S]uch a vision is a chimera, and [ ] this
version of autonomy is both undesirable and unattaina-
ble on an individual level, and therefore, destructive
from a policy perspective. We all experience depen-
dency, and we are all subsidized during our lives (al-
though unequally and inequitably so).
83
As used in this article, autonomy does not demand a rugged or radi-
cal individualism in which people are outside of communities, but in-
stead embraces individuals who make decisions with the support of and
in conjunction with the communities, large and small, to which they be-
long. As philosopher Joel Feinberg elucidates:
[I]f we so desire, we can minimize our commitments and
thus achieve a greater amount of de facto moral indepen-
dence. We may, if we wish, go through life unmarried,
or forgo having children, or near neighbors. We may
make as few promises as possible to others, incur no
debts, join no partnerships. The picture that emerges
from all of this is that of an uncommitted person, maxi-
mally independent of the demands of others. Yet it is
hard to imagine such a person with the moral virtues that
thrive on involvement-compassion, loyalty, coopera-
tiveness, engagement, trust. If we think of autonomy as
the name of a condition which is itself admirable, a kind
of ideal condition, then the uncommitted person is sub-
ject to demerits on this score. He is clearly no
paragon. 84
Few well-functioning human beings can, or would wish, to claim a
completely independent existence. We live in various webs of interde-
83 FINEMAN, supra note 82, at 272-273.
84 Feinberg, supra note 78, at 38 (internal citation omitted).
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pendence formed by families, friendships, employment, and citizenship
in various communities and countries. 85 Feinberg explains,
There is a danger in discussing, in the abstract, the ideal
qualities of a human being. Our very way of posing the
question can lead us to forget the most significant truth
about ourselves, that we are social animals. No individ-
ual person selects "autonomously" his own genetic in-
heritance or early upbringing. No individual person
selects his country, his language, his social community
and traditions. No individual invents afresh his tools, his
technology, his public institutions and procedures. And
yet to be a human being is to be part of a community, to
speak a language, to take one's place in an already func-
tioning group way of life. We come into awareness of
ourselves as part of ongoing social processes .... 86
One could, then, accurately describe all human beings who do not live
completely isolated lives as being simultaneously autonomous and de-
pendent, with the balance between the two shifting based on changes in
age, location, health status, and other factors.
In the context of children and adolescents, the development and ex-
istence of autonomy as a component of protecting one's moral status,
meaning the extent to which a person deserves to be an object of moral
concerns, 87 is as important as it is for adults. Feinberg explains:
In the continuous development of the relative-adult out
of the relative-child there is no point before which the
child himself has no part in his own shaping, and after
which he is the sole responsible maker of his own char-
acter and life plan. Such a radical discontinuity is sim-
ply not part of anyone's personal history. The extent of
the child's role in his own shaping is, instead, a process
of continuous growth already begun at birth .... From
85 "It is impossible to think of human beings except as part of ongoing communities,
defined by reciprocal bonds of obligation, common traditions, and institutions .... The ideal
of the autonomous person is that of an authentic individuals whose self-determination is as
complete as is consistent with the requirement that he is, of course, a member of a commu-
nity." Feinberg, supra note 78, at 45. In a similar vein, Martha Fineman explains, "[t]he very
terms of autonomy-as exemplified by economic independence and a detached notion of self-
sufficient-might well be redefined or reimagined in the public mind. Independence is not the
same as being unattached. Independence from subsidy and support is not attainable, nor is it
desirable; we want and need the webs of economic and social relationships that sustain us. It
is not beyond our current ability to imagine a new concept of autonomy, one that recognizes
that the individual lives within a variety of contexts and is dependent upon them." FINEMAN,
supra note 82, at 28.
86 Feinberg, supra note 78, at 45.
87 See STEPHEN HOLLAND, BIOETHICS (2003).
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the very beginning, then, the child must-inevitably
will-have some input in his own shaping, the extent of
which will grow continuously even as the child's charac-
ter itself does. After that, the child can contribute to-
wards the making of his own self and circumstances in
ever increasing degree. These contributions are signifi-
cant even though the child is in large part (especially in
the earliest years) the product of external influences over
which he has no control, and his original motivational
structure is something he just finds himself with, not
something he consciously creates. Always the self that
contributes to the making of the newer self is the product
of both outside influences and an earlier self that was not
quite as fully formed .... At every subsequent stage the
immature child plays a greater role in the creation of his
own life, until at the arbitrarily fixed point of full matur-
ity, he is at last fully in charge of himself, his more or
less finished character the product of a complicated in-
teraction of external influences. 88
Like most adults, adolescents have both voluntary and involuntary
commitments that impact their autonomy without depriving them of that
autonomy. There are "natural" commitments, described by Martha
Fineman as inevitable dependencies, 89 formed by youth and biological
dependence, but as we age we also make voluntary choices to continue to
be influenced in large and small ways by others including parents, teach-
ers, and friends. We commit to being a part of a family and being both a
leader and follower in our families. In other words:
If there is such a thing as "personal sovereignty," that
presumably belongs to all competent adults and to no
newborn infants, but before the point of qualification for
full sovereignty, children must be understood to have va-
rious degrees of "local autonomy.".... It becomes diffi-
cult, however, to think of the near-adult teenager as
deriving all of his autonomy by parental delegation. A
certain minimum, at least, he has by natural right, even if
his privileges to use the family car, to stay out past mid-
night, and the like, are delegated and revocable. 90
Equally as important is a recognition that an autonomous actor need
not always act rationally, or with kindness or compassion. For, "[a] self-
88 Feinberg, supra note 78, at 34.
89 FINEMAN, supra note 82. at 36.
90 Feinberg, supra note 78, at 46.
WHOSE BODY IS IT ANYWAY?
governing person is no less self-governed if he governs himself badly, no
less authentic for having evil principles, no less autonomous if he uses
his autonomy to commit aggression against another autonomous person.
The aggressor is morally deficient, but what he is deficient in is not nec-
essarily autonomy." 9' In this way, then, it is false to suggest that young
people lack autonomy because they may make decisions that appear irra-
tional, cruel, or otherwise deficient. Autonomy need not rest on an as-
sessment of the decision that might have been made by another, but
instead is premised upon the process by which an actor reaches a
decision.92
In the end, then, to appreciate and protect the moral status of adoles-
cents as persons, it is necessary to recognize that:
[T]he dichotomy between protecting children and pro-
tecting their rights to autonomy is false. Children who
are not protected, whose welfare is not advanced, will
not be able to exercise self-determination: on the other
hand, a failure to recognize the personality of children is
likely to result in an undermining of their protection with
children reduced to objects of intervention.
'93
Ultimately, to serve faithfully the dual purposes of protecting the
public health and preserving moral status, the law must seek to regulate
adolescent access to healthcare in a manner that is both practical and
ethical. Focusing solely on a public health rationale ignores the protec-
tion and enhancement of moral status that logically flows from health-
care emancipation statutes. Moral lawmaking requires reflecting on the
way in which the law can de-humanize and harm by failing to embrace
fully the personhood of a group of people-here, adolescents.
If it is right that healthcare emancipation statutes and the other ex-
ceptions to an assumption of adolescent incapacity for making healthcare
decisions serve both a public health and ethical purpose, then the quest to
fulfill that ethical purpose remains largely unacknowledged and therefore
unachieved. Rooted in concerns about adolescents eschewing necessary
care rather then acknowledging adolescent autonomy and capacity, the
exceptions detailed earlier in this section protect a broader societal inter-
est more than they do the personal status concerns of individual
adolescents. The ethical purpose of these statutes therefore feels incon-
sequential at worst and secondary to serving the public health at best.
91 Id. at 44.
92 Gerald Dworkin, The Concept of Autonomy, in THE INNER CrrADEL 62 (John
Christman ed., 1989) ("[T]here is no specific content to the decision an autonomous person
may take. An autonomous person may be a saint or sinner, a rugged individualist or a con-
formist, a leader or a follower.").
93 FREEMAN, supra note 82, at 53.
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There are reasons both ethical and practical why acknowledging and
protecting the inherent dignity of young people with a more comprehen-
sive system of healthcare autonomy is necessary. Truly protecting both
the personhood and the persons of adolescents requires a coherent theory
of what role the law should play in regulating family dynamics, access to
healthcare, and healthcare provider relationships when adolescents are
involved.
II. WHY THE LAW IS FAILING YOUNG PEOPLE
With adolescents, respect for persons means balancing
respect for the emerging capacity of an adolescent for
independent decision-making with the need for contin-
ued special protections, where necessary.
94
This article advocates that laws regulating adolescent access to
healthcare should encourage, or at least not impede, healthcare decision-
making that avoids unnecessary fracturing of families, respects the ca-
pacity of the involved parties, supports positive healthcare provider-pa-
tient relationships, minimizes the need for state interference through the
child welfare system or courts, and provides for an environment in which
affected parties can make decisions that protect the physical and emo-
tional health of the patient. The primary goal of law in the arena of ado-
lescent healthcare should be to facilitate sound medical decision-making
by and for young people through ethically sound legislation. This over-
arching goal can best be achieved by encouraging family communica-
tion, recognizing and supporting real-life decision-making patterns put in
place by well-functioning families, and facilitating optimal healthcare
provider/patient relationships to maximize the potential for good health
outcomes. This section will address the importance of each of these fac-
tors and the ways in which the current system of laws fails to achieve
them.
A. FAMILY COMMUNICATION
The law as currently configured discourages family communication
in at least two ways. First, by making the parent the only party legally
capable of consenting to most adolescent healthcare, the law allows par-
ents to avoid difficult conversations with young people about illness, in-
cluding terminal illnesses or diseases with particularly difficult
treatments. 95 Parents in crisis may choose to keep information from their
94 SOCIETY FOR ADOLESCENT MEDICINE, Guidelines for Adolescent Health Research, 33
J. OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH 396, 398 (2003).
95 In the case of young children living with HIV, the American Academy of Pediatrics
reports that:
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child that the parents feel would be overwhelming or discouraging. 96
Anthropologist Myra Bluebond Langner observed in a study of children
dying from leukemia that "[s]ome parents felt that protection also meant
shielding the children from knowledge of the prognosis. They rational-
ized withholding information ... even using deception with statements
like 'You'll get better'. . . on grounds that this protected children from
unhappiness and the possibility of an inadvertent premature death. '97
Often, young people will be well aware that something very serious is
wrong with them, and the deception by caregivers and parents will
heighten the patient's sense of alienation, disconnect, and powerlessness
created by the illness. 98
Similarly, when young people find themselves in crisis moments-
i.e., pregnant, drug dependent, or infected with an STI-healthcare
emancipation statutes allow them to access care without parental knowl-
edge or consent, but do not necessarily give healthcare providers clear
guidance about whether, or when, the healthcare provider has the legal
authority or legal responsibility to involve an adult caretaker in decision-
making. Thus, a young person may engage in independent dezision-
making even where an informed parent would have been willing and able
to provide non-injurious adult guidance. The needs of young people are
[S]ome parents and health care professionals are reluctant to inform children about
their HIV infection status. Data from several centers indicate that between 25% and
90% of school-age children with HIV infection/AIDS have not been told they are
infected. Some of the reasons given by family members for not disclosing HIV
infection/AIDS status are similar to reasons expressed by parents of children with
other serious diseases, which include concerns about the impact that disclosure may
have on a child's emotional health and fear by the parents that the knowledge will
negatively affect a child's will to live. Additional reasons often given by the parents
of HIV-infected children include a sense of guilt about having transmitted infection
to the child, anger from the child related to knowledge of perinatal transmission, and
fear of inadvertent disclosure by the child. Disclosure of status by the child may
lead to stigmatization, discrimination, or ostracism toward the child and other family
members. Health care professionals and families are also concerned about the diffi-
culty children have keeping a 'secret' and limiting the disclosure to selected persons.
Disclosure of Illness Status to Children and Adolescents with HIV Infection, 103 PEDIATRICS
164, 164 (1999). See also, Carol J. Claflin & Oscar A. Barbarin, Does "Telling" Less Protect
More? Relationships Among Age, Information Disclosure, and What Children with Cancer See
and Feel, 16 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 169 (1991) (reporting study in which many parents de-
clined to inform young children of their own cancer diagnosis based on a desire to avoid
overwhelming the young patient).
96 See Claflin & Barbarin, supra note 95; see also, MYRA BLUEBOND-LANGNER, THE
PRIVATE WORLDS OF DYING CHILDREN 214-217 (1978).
97 BLUEBOND-LANGNER, supra note 96, at 217.
98 Id. at 135-209 (describing the extensive knowledge about their illness, treatment and
hospital surrounding of children with leukemia in spite of "[a] situation in which the parents
and the staff unconsciously conspired to keep them in painless ignorance"); see also Jennifer
L. Evans, Are Children Competent to Make Decisions About Their Own Deaths?, 13 BEHAV.
Sci. & L. 27, 31 (1995) ("Most healthcare professionals agree that children with fatal illnesses
are aware of their prognoses, even if they have not been told directly.").
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better served by encouraging healthcare providers to engage in dialogue
with young people about parental involvement and to consider both the
wishes of the patient and the risks and benefits of parental involvement
based on confidential conversations with the patient.
B. REAL FAMILIES MAKING REAL DECISIONS
While writing much more broadly on questions of autonomy, de-
pendence, and privacy of the caretaking unit, Martha Fineman offers an
abbreviated discussion on issues of children's autonomy within families.
She writes,
[T]he determination of typical and atypical modes of op-
eration in caretaker-dependent units presents an empiri-
cal question. My assumption is that a careful study
would show that the relationship between typical care-
takers and dependents is dynamic (it is in motion), fluid
(easily changing shape), and interactive (the participants
act upon each other). The reciprocal interactive nature
of the relationship ensures that it will not be fixed. The
reciprocity also means that in regard to family decision
making [sic], the dependent will seldom, if ever, be
absent.99
She continues:
Caretakers typically consider dependents' needs. Often
dependents are an explicit part of the process of decision
making [sic], and at times they are even in control of it.
Just as the relationship is fluid within daily interaction, it
is dynamic over time. While the authority of parent over
a child will decline as the years pass, an adult child's
authority over (and responsibility for) an elderly or ill
parent may increase."' 1
While I agree with Fineman about the fluidity of parent (caretaker)/
child (dependent) relationships and their interactive nature, I would also
contend that the structure of medical decision-making, as reinforced and
required by the law, minimizes the role to be played by the dependent
who, though not absent, may not be afforded the opportunity to be fully
present in healthcare decision-making. As I will argue more explicitly in
the pages that follow, true respect for adolescent autonomy requires more
than simply informing a young person of what will happen to her and
99 FINEMAN, supra note 82, at 305.
100 Id. at 306.
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demands that the law place greater emphasis on her right to be actively
engaged by caretakers and healthcare providers.
The law gives wide latitude to parents to make decisions about
healthcare treatment for minor children and companion decisions about
whether their children should even be made aware of their own dis-
eases.11 In circumstances in which a child is too young to comprehend
the nature of an illness and the risk and benefits of treatment, it is cer-
tainly justifiable or at least understandable to let the parent be sole arbiter
of what is best for the child with an understanding that the state can
interfere based on reports from other parties about the risk to the health
of the child. Parents are the logical decision makers if one presumes that
"parents, in contrast to their minor children, possess the intelligence, ma-
turity, and experience needed for adequate and appropriate health care
decisionmaking; and. . .that parents usually have an identity of interest
with their minor children and will act in their best interests."' 0 2 Never-
theless, even if it is appropriate to withhold information from a young
child, cloaking an adolescent in ignorance is much less defensible. At
some point, it becomes patently inappropriate, unethical, and practically
unwise to make a decisionally-capable individual an outsider in conver-
sations and decisions about her own health.
The discussion that follows rests upon several key assumptions, the
most important of which is that in well-functioning families parents en-
courage adolescents to play a substantial role in decisions about the
young person's own health. This initial assumption embraces a belief
that most parents respect and love their children and generally avoid act-
ing in ways which will injure those children and that parents want to
impart life lessons to their children by encouraging them to care for their
health, take personal responsibility for their own well-being, and act in
their own best interest so that they can utilize these skills as they age and
when their parents are absent. Though they may sometimes resist ac-
knowledging that their babies have become young men and women, I
also assume that parents must recognize an adolescent's growing capac-
ity and learn to respond to that capacity for mature, forward thinking
decision-making. Importantly, when families are functioning well, par-
ents recognize that young people who feel alienated will be less coopera-
tive with needed care. Finally, I assume that parents recognize that their
o0I One could argue that investiture by law with the right to consent or withhold consent
for healthcare does not automatically confer on parents the right to withhold information from
a sick child. In fact, it seems logical to presume that these rights are not necessarily intercon-
nected and become so only as a result of interpretative choices made by the legal profession
rather than as a result of an intrinsic need to treat both knowledge and consent as being neces-
sarily the same.
102 OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 6, at 125.
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adolescents can and will make good decisions, particularly when sup-
ported and offered guidance by trusted adults.
Even though most parents respect and wish to do well for their chil-
dren, there must also always be concern about the parent who does not
act in the best interest of his child for a variety of reasons. Some parents
suffer from drug or alcohol addictions that impair their ability to partici-
pate regularly and soundly in decision-making about their child's health.
Some parents are abusive and may deprive their child of needed care for
reasons of spite, punishment, or fear of legal consequences because of
the role that they have played in causing their child's harm. For some
parents, despite best intentions and grave concern, their instincts may not
always serve the interests of a child. As one author explains:
The assumption that parents best understand what is in
the best interest of their child is usually sound. How-
ever, situations can arise in which the parents' distress
prevents them from attending carefully to the child's
concerns and wishes. Simply complying with the par-
ents' wishes in such cases is inadequate. It is more help-
ful and respectful of the child to affirm the parents'
responsibility for the care of their child while allowing
the child to exercise choice in a measure appropriate to
his or her level of development and experience of illness
and treatment. This approach does not discount the par-
ents' concerns and wishes, but recognizes the child as
the particular patient to whom the healthcare provider
has a primary duty of care.10 3
Undoubtedly, a very young child generally cannot fully comprehend
and respond to a serious health crisis. 104 By contrast, many, if not most,
adolescents can respond to such a crisis, particularly when supported by
trusted adults, both by acting in her own interest and in that of those
around her. 105 For whatever reason, whether based on defensible or in-
defensible premises, 0 6 a parent should not hold hostage a young person
103 Christine Harrison et al., Bioethics for Clinicians: Involving Children in Medical De-
cisions, 156 CAN. MED..ASS'N J. 825, 826 (1997).
104 See infra notes 124-141 and accompanying text.
105 Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adoles-
cents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1595-96 (1982).
106 I use these terms with a certain bit of looseness. I use the term "defensible premises"
to suggest the ability to defend a decision because it is premised upon thorough knowledge of
a young person's health situation. I contrast this with "indefensible premises," including, but
certainly not being limited to, those held by a parent who refuses to accept that a child is ill or
who otherwise will not actively engage in the process of becoming informed before making a
healthcare decision for a child.
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who, if given the opportunity, has the capacity for thoughtful decision-
making.
Adolescents may possess a value system or religious faith that dif-
fers from that of their parents; they may desire treatment with which a
parent disagrees; or they may be estranged from their parents and simply
feel no obligation to involve the parent in their healthcare decisions.
10 7
Parents may be in crisis and incapable of thinking rationally about the
needs of a young person. In these situations, state child welfare agencies
and courts have typically been the source of protection for young people.
Yet, it is possible that in most situations young people can act in their
own best interest if given the legal authority and support to do so.
C. ADOLESCENT CAPACITY
An important, though not singular, basis of parental consent rules
for adolescent healthcare decision-making is the belief that adolescents
lack decision-making capacity. Therefore, a discussion of adolescent de-
cisional capacity is a necessary component to any argument about ex-
tending the healthcare consent rights of young people.
According to the Hastings Center, decision-making capacity exists
when a patient has "(a) the ability to comprehend information relevant to
the decision, (b) the ability to deliberate [about choices] in accordance
with [personal] values and goals, and (c) the ability to communicate [ver-
bally or nonverbally] with caregivers."' 0 8 This formulation does not al-
low for a finding of decision-making capacity where a patient
demonstrates "an inability to reach or communicate a decision,"'
1 9
meaning that a patient either "cannot make up his or her mind or vacil-
lates to such a degree that it is impossible to implement a treatment
choice"I " 0 or "the patient is unable effectively to make known his or her
wishes regarding treatment."'
107 Some courts have protected physicians from tortious liability to parents claiming harm
as a result of medical care provided to their minor children without their knowledge or con-
sent. See, e.g., Carter v. Cangello, 105 Cal. App. 3d 348 (1980) (upholding summary judg-
ment for physician as against parents whose daughter was living away from home and had
consented to care from the physician). In contrast, where care is provided to a minor for the
benefit of a third party and the physician does not obtain parental consent, liability may exist.
See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (holding that physician could be liable
for assault and battery where he failed to secure parental consent for a fifteen-year-old boy
who subjected himself to an operation for the benefit of another).
108 THE HASTINGS CTR., GUIDELINES ON TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
AND THE CARE OF THE DYING (1987); see also Jessica Wilen Berg et al., Constructing Compe-
tence: Formulating Standards of LegalCompetence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUrGERS
L. REV. 345, 351 (1996) (footnote omitted).
109 Berg et al., supra note 108, at 352.
110 Id. at 352-353.
Il Id.
2005]
284 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14:251
A patient lacks an ability to understand relevant information if she
lacks "the ability to comprehend concepts involved, especially in the in-
formed consent disclosure; it does not require the patient to comprehend
the situation as a whole." 12 In order to meet the criteria, the patient
must display an ability to appreciate the nature of the situation and its
likely consequences by
apply[ing] information that is understood in a context-
neutral sense to his or her own situation. . . . Patients
who accept that their physicians believe they are ill, but
deny that there is a problem in the face of objective evi-
dence to the contrary, would fail this component.... On
the other hand, refusal of potentially beneficial, even
life-saving, treatment does not necessarily indicate that a
patient is incompetent."r3
Patients with decision-making capacity will be able to manipulate
information rationally, which "addresses the patient's reasoning capacity
or ability to employ logical thought processes to compare the risks and
benefits of treatment options. This criterion does not look at the outcome
of a decision, but, like understanding and appreciation, it is concerned
with the patient's decisionmaking process." 114 Though there is a risk
that such a standard would allow finding a lack of decision-making ca-
pacity where a patient chose an unconventional path, or any path not
recommended by a healthcare provider, appropriate application of this
criterion would not allow for such an ends-biased result. 115
Using these decision-making capacity criteria as a backdrop, it is
possible to see that many young people possess such a capacity and
could provide knowing, intelligent, and voluntary consent for a range of
healthcare treatments. For purposes of healthcare decision-making, the
term "knowing" "can be interpreted as one's understanding of the seman-
tic content of the information that is provided by the professional ....
[K]nowing can be defined operationally as the match between the infor-
mation given to the patient and the patient's own paraphrase of that of
which he/she has been informed.1 16
Intelligent consent "focuses upon the competence of the patient to
arrive at the consent decision rationally, not upon others' opinions con-
112 Id. at 353-354.
113 Id. at 353-356 (footnotes omitted).
114 Id. at 357.
115 "Inclusion of rational manipulation in a legal standard of competence may seem troub-
lesome because it could lead to incompetence adjudications based simply on the unconvention-
ality of a patient's decisions. If the legal standard is sensibly applied, however, this fear is
unwarranted." Id. at 358 (footnotes omitted).
116 Grisso & Vierling, supra note 1, at 416.
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cerning the advisability of the patient's decision itself."" 7 In other
words, the intelligence prong of informed consent can be viewed as an-
other way of asking whether the patient possesses decision-making
capacity.
Finally, voluntariness refers to a person's ability to provide consent
"that is not merely an acquiescent or deferent response to authority."' 18
Ultimately, a healthcare provider should base an evaluation of decision-
making capacity for a young person upon her "ability to understand and
communicate relevant information, ability to think and choose with some
degree of independence, ability to assess the potential for benefit, risks,
or harms as well as to consider the consequences and multiple options,
and achievement of a fairly stable set of values."
119
One study of healthcare provider practices made several useful find-
ings about the relationship between healthcare providers and their ado-
lescent patients. First, over half of the healthcare providers responding
to the survey reported that their adolescent patients "understand informa-
tion about medical treatment and conditions, engage in rational delibera-
tion during the decisional process, and communicate choices and
concerns clearly." 120 Even more importantly, "more than four fifths of
physicians (86.7 percent, n=150) agreed that adolescent patients demon-
strate an ability to understand information about their medical condition
and treatment."1 21 Other study findings reflected healthcare provider
perceptions that their adolescent patients possessed communication skills
that allowed them to successfully discuss and share their healthcare pref-
erences and that these choices were the product of rational thought.1
22
Further, the majority of healthcare providers did not believe that their
adolescent patients were more prone to risk taking in their medical deci-
sion-making than are adults. 123 While it would be inappropriate to base a
change in law solely upon one small study of healthcare provider atti-
tudes and perceptions, the study results provide a basis for questioning
the extent to which the law's attempt to protect young people from their
own potentially detrimental medical decision-making is necessary or
steeped in reality.
Current laws ignore what many healthcare providers know from ex-
perience with young patients and what research has shown, mainly that
adolescents possess a developed capacity for decision-making that is on
par with that of young adults. One study compared the decision-making
117 Id. at 418.
118 Id. at 421.
119 Harrison et al., supra note 103, at 827 (citation omitted).
120 Hartman, supra note 24, at 103.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 103-104.
123 Id. at 105.
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of two groups of minors, the first group consisting of nine and ten year
old children and the second consisting of fourteen and fifteen year olds,
against a group of young adults aged twenty-one through twenty-five. 124
Of the three groups, only the latter consisted of individuals presumed
competent to make healthcare decisions.1 25 The study authors were par-
ticularly concerned about the ability of young people to make voluntary
decisions given the strong influence of parents and sought to discover
how readily a minor could engage in independent decision-making in the
face of parental influence or conflict. 126
Each study participant, all of whom provided written consent to the
study along with the parents of the minor participants, was asked to re-
spond to three hypothetical medical dilemmas by selecting a treatment
option after being apprised of the nature of the disease and its available
treatments. 127 While the researchers offered several caveats about the
findings, including the fact that the study group was largely middle and
upper-middle class and of average intelligence and that the participants
were asked to respond to hypothetical situations, 128 the study does offer
some small insight into directions for policymaking.
First, the lead study author, David Scherer, notes, "[y]oung adults
and adolescents. . . appear to be approaching medical decision making
with a quality of intentionality that is not seen in the decisions made by
children."1 29 He adds, "the law can be notified. that, at least in regard to
medical decisions presented in this research, there is no conclusive evi-
dence to presume that adolescents are incapable of a voluntary consent
comparable to that of young adults."'130 He also includes the caveat that,
"it cannot be totally refuted, particularly with younger adolescents, that
there may be important differences between adolescents and young
adults in the quality and quantity of decision-making autonomy that they
may exercise in medical treatment decisions. Consequently, there may
be a need for continued state over[s]ight in these matters."' 3' Scherer
raises a specific concern about the degree of parental influence acting as
a coercive force thus negating the voluntary element of a young person's
consent.132 The author notes, "[t]here appears to be minimal risk to fam-
ily integrity by including minors in routine medical decisions affecting
124 David G. Scherer, The Capacities of Minors to Exercise Voluntariness in Medical
Treatment Decisions, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 431, 436 (1991).
125 Id. at 435.
126 Id. at 436-37.
127 Id. at 435-37.
128 Id. at 445-46.
129 id. at 444.
130 Id. at 446.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 434-35.
WHOSE BODY Is IT ANYWAY?
them. Even young adult offspring seem inclined to defer to parental
judgment in routine medical matters, when parents feel strongly about a
decision." 133 This finding suggests that concerns about adolescent rebel-
lion leading to bad choices may be overblown and inaccurate.
In another study in which the researchers asked a group of young
people to respond to hypothetical health care dilemmas, the researchers
reported that:
In general, minors aged 14 . . . demonstrate a level of
competency equivalent to that of adults, according to
four standards of competency (evidence of choice, rea-
sonable outcome, rational reasons, and understanding),
and for four hypothetical dilemmas (diabetes, epilepsy,
depression, and enuresis). Younger minors aged 9, how-
ever, appeared less competent than adults according to
the standards of competency requiring understanding
and a rational reasonable process. Yet, according to the
standards of evidence of choice and reasonable outcome,
even these younger minors appeared competent.1
34
The study authors wrote:
The findings of this research do not lend support to poli-
cies which deny adolescents the right of self determina-
tion in treatment situations on the basis of a presumption
of incapacity to provide informed consent. The age of
18 or 21 as the "cutoffs" [sic] below which individuals
are presumed to be incompetent to make determinations
about their own welfare do not reflect psychological ca-
pacities of most adolescents.
135
A comprehensive review and analysis of literature in developmental
psychology also found that "there is little evidence that minors of age 15
and above as a group are any less competent to provide consent than are
adults."' 136 The authors concluded: "[M]inors are entitled to have some
form of consent or dissent regarding the things that happen tothem in the
name of assessment, treatment or other professional activities that have
generally been determined unilaterally by adults in the minor's inter-
est." 137 In a similar vein, yet another review of the literature on child
development led a researcher to determine that "by age 14 years, many
minors attain the cognitive developmental stage associated with the psy-
133 Id. at 446.
134 Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 105, at 1595-96.
135 Id. at 1596.
136 Grisso & Vierling, supra note 1, at 420.
137 Id.
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chological elements of rational consent" and further concluded that "mi-
nors between 11 and 14 years of age appear to be in a transition period
[and] there appear to be no psychological grounds for the general as-
sumption that minors 15 years of age or older cannot provide competent
consent." 13
8
Professional groups have taken note of the literature on the cogni-
tive development of adolescents. The American Academy of Pediatrics
("AAP") notes that "review of the limited relevant empirical data sug-
gests that adolescents, especially those age 14 and older, may have as
well developed decisional skills as adults for making informed health
care decisions."' 39 The Society for Adolescent Medicine ("the Society")
has also indicated that its membership shares the view that adolescent
decisional skills may be as developed as those of adults. 140 Based on this
data and their own experience with young patients, these medical profes-
sionals have expressed support for granting young people, specifically
those who are fourteen or older, greater rights to participation in deci-
sions about their own healthcare.' 4 1
It is worthwhile to note that "[c]ompetence is not an 'all or nothing'
quality; it develops gradually, particularly if the child has opportunities
to try out budding skills. A child does not always have a general level of
competence. Rather, a child may be competent in one area, but not in
another, and may be competent to take on part of a given task, but not
the whole." 142 Furthermore, "while the words 'competence,' 'compe-
tent' and 'capable' may cover some of the same qualities as 'intelligent'
does, they imply abilities that are more than merely cognitive." 143 In
other words, even if a young person lacks competence or decision-mak-
ing capacity in one arena, that lack would not necessarily preclude a
finding of decision-making capacity for the purpose of an individual
healthcare decision.
A required aspect of developing decision-making capacity is the
grant of opportunities to actually make decisions. 144 In other words:
138 Sanford L. Leikin, Minors' Assent or Dissent to Medical Treatment, 102 J. PEDIATRICS
169, 173 (1983).
139 AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS COMMITTEE ON BIOETHICS, Informed Consent,
Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314, 317 (1995).
140 See SOCIETY FOR ADOLESCENT MEDICINE, Access to Healthcare for Adolescents: A
Position Paper of the Society for Adolescent Medicine, 13 J. OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH 162
(1992).
141 Id.
142 Milfrid Grude Flekkoy, Psychology and the Rights of the Child, in CHILDREN AS
EQUALS: EXPLORING THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 73, 79 (Kathleen Alaimo & Brian Klug eds.,
2002).
143 Id.
144 "With the principle of evolving capacities, we recognize that children come to have
capacities of moral agency, that these capacities develop in the child with the assistance of
caring adults, and are enhanced through meaningful participation in matters where children's
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The important point here is that children come to de-
velop capacities for decision-making and for exercising
liberties through guidance and practice. Just as a child
learns to read or gather roots by actively participating in
these endeavors with adults or older children, so too a
child learns what is right and wrong, acceptable or unac-
ceptable, by active participation in the moral commu-
nity. Among the most important capacities a child ought
to develop is the capacity to recognize her interests, to
prioritize them, and to balance competing interests (both
other interests of her own and those of other persons).
For the development of these abilities, however, she
needs careful and considerate assistance by those per-
sons who have some concern that her best interests are
met, and who are able to assess the possible conse-
quences for the sake of certain long term interests, and
vice versa. 1
45
To be given age-appropriate information about one's own health
and make decisions based on consultation with whoever is deemed an
appropriate source of advice is a fitting show of respect for a young per-
son's need to grow into full maturity. Even without the support of the
law, many healthcare providers working with young people have deter-
mined that professionally appropriate and ethically sound care for an ad-
olescent requires that the healthcare provider allocate significant
decision-making power to an adolescent patient, including maintaining
the confidentiality of the healthcare provider-patient relationship against
the parent's desire to know what is taking place with his child.
146
Healthcare providers may assume this posture even though in most states
and circumstances the law does not require or necessarily allow this
balance. 14
7
A shift to greater recognition of the competence of young people
has significant and diverse precedent. There are several contexts outside
of healthcare in which the law recognizes that children gain greater au-
tonomy as they become older even if they have not yet reached the age of
majority. For instance, family courts routinely allow or even require that
older children participate in decisions about custody, visitation, and
own interests are at stake." Christina M. Bellon, The Promise of Rights for Children: Best
Interests and Evolving Capacities, in CHILDREN AS EQUALS: EXPLORING THE RIGHTS OF THE
CHILD 112 (Kathleen Alaimo & Brian Klug eds., 2002) (internal citation omitted).
145 Id. at I11.
146 Hartman, supra note 24, at 110-11.
147 See id. at 112-13.
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adoption.148 Even those who sit in judgment in such courts admit that
the participation of the young people who are the subjects of such pro-
ceedings, particularly those who are fourteen or older, is warranted and
necessary. 149 One judge has written, "When a child fourteen years of
age or older states a preference [for custody], courts should accept it as
controlling if the preference is expressed after an informed consent dia-
logue takes place."'150 Though the young person may not always have a
veto power, there is unquestionable recognition that she is capable of
understanding the proceedings and providing input that can be valuable
to the decision-maker.
Similarly, tort law provides no immunity based solely upon the age
of an accused tortfeasor.' 5' Rather, a person who has not reached the age
of majority may avoid liability for intentional torts only if she can make
a showing that she lacked "the mental capacity to commit a tort in the
first place."' 152 Youth and experience may also be relevant to whether an
actor has acted negligently.' 53 Thus, even very young children may be
found liable for tortious activity despite their chronological age.
Even in the healthcare context, there is a certain degree to which
adolescents and perhaps even younger children have some modicum of
veto power over decisions being made on their behalf. For instance, it is
unlikely that a provider would perform an abortion on a developmentally
148 According to the Administration for Children and Families, "[a]pproximately 47
States ... require that older children give consent to their adoption. Twenty-three States ... set
the age of consent at 14 years; 18 States ... at 12 years; and seven States ... require consent
of children age 10 and above. In some States, the requirement can be dispensed with if the
child lacks the mental capacity to consent, or the court finds it in the best interest of the child
to dispense with consent." NATIONAL ADOPTION INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE, 2003 Adop-
tion State Statute Series Statutes-at-a-Glance: Consent to Adoption, available at http://
naic.acf.hhs.gov/general/legal/statutes/consent.cfm; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.040
(Michie 2003) (requiring consent of potential adoptees who are ten years of age or older unless
the court finds that consent is not in the child's best interest); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-206
(Michie 2003) (requiring consent of children ten years of age or older unless the courts find
that consent would not be in the child's best interest); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-4 (2002) (requir-
ing consent to adoption from child fourteen or older). Similarly, some states direct judges to
consider the wishes of the child in custody proceedings. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9-2:4
(West 2004) (directing a court to consider "the preference of the child when of sufficient age
and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent decision" when making a custody
determination).
149 "With respect to children below the age of six, most judges considered the child's
wishes to be irrelevant. By contrast, ninety percent of the judges deemed children's wishes to
be either dispositive or extremely important when they were fourteen years old and older."
Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity to Choose, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1873, 1887-88 (1996) (summarizing study in Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Chil-
dren's Preference in Custody Decisions, 22 GA. L. REV. 1035, 1042 (1988)).
150 Id. at 1908.
151 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 134 (5th ed. 1984).
152 Id.
153 Id.
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normal young person who refused the procedure even if her parents de-
manded it.
154
D. HEALTHCARE PROVIDER-PATIENT RELATIONSHIPS AND OPTIMAL
OUTCOMES
The relationship between any patient, adult or a minor, can be one
of power imbalance given issues of expertise and authority that are al-
most universally present in exchanges between medical professionals and
their patients. However, the uneven distribution of authority can be even
more pronounced when the patient is young:
If adults have little involvement in decision making re-
lated to their own care . . . then children have almost
none. . . . Children are taken to physicians by adults
whenever the child has a problem or the adult has a
problem. In the office, many physicians limit their ver-
bal interactions to the adult caretaker, viewing the child
primarily as the bearer of pathology (if any is
present).1
55
Consultation with a child patient is not a priority for some health-
care providers, although the needs of the patient and the patient's will-
ingness to participate in therapy about which she has no say evolves as a
patient moves from child to adolescent.
The relationship between adolescent healthcare providers and their
patients requires a shift from the relationship between children and their
pediatricians. In the early years of the specialty of adolescent medicine,
practitioners recognized the need to alter their previous ways of dealing
with young people and "respect for the patients' point of view [became]
a crucial component of successful medical care for adolescents."' 56 The
founder of one early adolescent unit in Boston Children's Hospital, J.
Roswell Gallagher, "ensured that from the moment a teenager entered
the Adolescent Unit, he or she was treated with the same level of respect
and dignity as an adult patient."
1 57
154 In Stump v. Sparkman, a case which hopefully does not reflect modem practice, a
healthcare provider did act in accord with the wishes of a parent to conduct unnecessary sur-
gery on an adolescent, performing a sterilization procedure on an adolescent girl based on the
mother's concerns about her daughter's promiscuity. See 435 U.S. 349 (1978). The girl was
not informed about the nature of the surgery and only discovered what had taken place when,
as an adult, she and her husband sought to have a child. Id.
155 Charles E. Lewis, Decision Making Related to Health, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO
CONSENT, supra note 20, at 76.
156 PRESCOTT, supra note 16, at 77.
157 Id. at 79.
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Gallagher insisted that patients be seen separately from
their parents so that they would feel that the doctor was
truly interested in them rather than their parents. Al-
though parents were the only ones allowed to set up the
first appointment, Gallagher recommended that patients
themselves be allowed to make all further appointments
so that they would not feel they were being forced to
come to the clinic. The receptionist would introduce pa-
tients to their doctors as "Miss" or "Mr." Gallagher ad-
vised his physicians to avoid a patronizing tone when
dealing with patients. "It is important to do everything
possible to avoid an authoritarian atmosphere," wrote
Gallagher, for adolescents "quickly recognize, and re-
spond well to a physician who is slow to suggest, more
eager to listen than to talk, and who usually listens with-
out apparent approval or disapproval of what he is
told. 158
Gallagher's prescription for creating an atmosphere conducive to a
good relationship between patient and provider went so far as to recom-
mend that physicians not sit behind their desks when speaking to pa-
tients. 159 Gallagher also warned physicians against "pandering too
shamelessly to teenagers" which would serve to alienate them.' 60 He
stressed the importance of making sure that young people were "ade-
quately informed about the nature of their problem and the course of
treatment."1 61 Failure to provide this transparency "not only would de-
crease the likelihood that a teenager would comply with medical advice,
but could also lead to unnecessary panic in the young person, and possi-
bly cause unacceptable and self-destructive forms of behavior."' 62 Fi-
nally, Gallagher urged that the physician "treat... the adolescent patient
as a person mean[ing] that physicians did not let parental demands super-
sede the best interests of the patient." 63 While this did not mean that the
healthcare provider should completely exclude parents from the care be-
ing provided to their adolescent children, it did require that the physician
maintain a "primary emphasis" on providing assistance to the young per-
son as her healthcare provider. 64
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 80.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 81.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 100.
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The complexities of adolescent medicine continue to create dilem-
mas for healthcare providers. In a 1999 survey conducted by the AAP,
61.4% of responding healthcare providers identified the "availability of
clearly defined state statutes on confidentiality, consent and other legal
issues" as "very effective in reducing potential barriers to providing ado-
lescent health care." 165 This finding indicates that both healthcare prov-
iders and their adolescent patients would benefit from more integrated
and consistently articulated legal approach to standards of consent and
confidentiality for young people.
Those offering healthcare to adolescents find themselves entangled
in a difficult quandary as they seek to provide care that falls within the
ethical precepts of medicine without running afoul of the law. One
writer describes the dilemma as follows:
Many health care providers believe that older children,
and especially adolescents, are capable of enabling sub-
stituted judgment (through expressed preferences) or
even of making independent health care decisions. Such
beliefs often put providers in conflict between ethical
and legal mandates; ethical principles, on the one hand,
argue that minors should be enabled to participate in
self-directed decision-making to the largest extent possi-
ble, while legal constraints, on the other hand, restrict
competency. In general, adolescents who are 14 years of
age and above are thought to have sufficient decisional
capacity to consent to treatment for themselves. Certain
experienced providers also believe that children as
young as 10, who have battled life-threatening or
chronic illness and developed a maturity beyond their
years in that particular sphere, also possess health care
decisional capacity. 16
6
By neglecting to support high quality healthcare provider-patient re-
lationships, the law can discourage or prevent the use of the best medical
practices, thus compromising the quality of care offered to an adolescent
patient. The law in its convoluted state does not mirror the current state
of medical practice in which healthcare providers, particularly pediatri-
cians and specialists in adolescent medicine, have a much broader sense
of the ability of young people to understand and meaningfully participate
165 AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, Periodic Survey of Fellows, Providing Health-
care to Adolescents: Pediatricians' Attitudes and Practices, available at http://www.aap.org/
research/periodicsurvey/ps42aexs.htm.
166 Sarah Friebert, Healthcare Decision-making in Pediatric Palliative Care (March
2004), available at http://www.nacwltc.org/helpfulArticles/helpfularticles.asp.
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in their own healthcare. 167 Too often, in its attempts to balance the inter-
ests of both parents and young people, the law forces healthcare provid-
ers to privilege concerns about legal liability over their assessment of the
needs of a patient. Thus, in some circumstances, the law constrains the
healthcare provider from offering the highest quality of care to an adoles-
cent patient in violation of basic professional obligations.
Consent, specifically informed consent, is a cornerstone of provid-
ing non-tortious medical care to a patient. 168 A healthcare provider who
treats an individual in a non-emergency situation without first obtaining
the informed consent of the patient or a person authorized to make deci-
sions for an incompetent patient subjects herself to serious legal conse-
quences for breaching her professional duty. 169 Informed consent is not
simply a way of protecting physicians from legal liability. Rather, it is a
primary means of respecting the autonomy of patients because one can-
not act autonomously when denied access to information that is pertinent
to the decision at hand. 170 As described by the American Medical Asso-
ciation ("AMA"), "[i]nformed consent is more than simply getting a pa-
tient to sign a written consent form."' 171 At minimum, the AMA
recommends that a physician, not a representative, inform the patient of
his diagnosis, the nature of the treatment and alternatives as well as the
risks and benefits of treatment or foregoing treatment.172 The obligation
to obtain informed consent is both legal and ethical. 173 The idea of in-
formed consent in no less important for adolescents, but the law deems
consent offered by parents sufficient to satisfy the physician's duty to her
patient. 174
167 Hartman, supra note 24, at 87-88.
168 Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Law of Informed Consent: From "Doctor is Right" to "Patient
Has Rights," 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243, 1245 (2000) ("Today, the right of a patient to par-
ticipate to some extent in medical decision making affecting the patient is universally dictated
by the 'informed consent' laws of all states.").
169 OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 6, at 124 ("The doctrine of informed con-
sent holds, therefore, that physicians and surgeons have a duty to give their adult patients the
information necessary for making an informed and voluntary choice concerning medical treat-
ment or surgery; the failure by a physician or surgeon to obtain informed consent from a
patient may give rise to a civil liability and an award of damages.").
170 Friebert, supra note 166 ("The primary ethical principle in health care decision-mak-
ing is personal autonomy, or self-determination. True autonomy presupposes informed con-
sent, and is based upon the principle of respect for persons.").




174 AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS COMMITTEE ON BIOETHICS, supra note 139, at
314 ("We now realize that the doctrine of 'informed consent' has only limited direct applica-
tion in pediatrics. Only patients who have appropriate decisional capacity and legal empower-
ment can give their informed consent to medical care. In all other situations, parents or other
surrogates provide informed permission for diagnosis and treatment of children with the assent
of the child whenever appropriate.").
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According to the Society, healthcare providers for adolescents
should "provide complete and thorough physical and psychosocial evalu-
ation and treatment in an atmosphere of trust and confidentiality."1 75 A
long list of barriers to care for young people includes, in addition to
financial constraints, the difficulties inherent in seeking to provide confi-
dential care in a context in which a third party is responsible for con-
senting to care for an adolescent. 176 The Society writes:
Most physicians support providing confidential care to
adolescents, but many are uncomfortable with family
negotiations that may surround independent care and de-
cision-making. Although evidence suggests that adoles-
cents aged 14 years and older are able to make good
decisions about their own health, most still benefit from
their parents' involvement with treatment, and most still
need help in paying for care. The wide variation in state
laws pertaining to parental consent further complicates
the issues for health professionals, adolescents, and par-
ents. The resulting confusion, coupled with fears of dis-
closure, diagnosis, and treatment, may cause adolescents
to delay or avoid needed care.
177
Although the Society places a significant value on confidentiality
and a strong emphasis on urging young people to involve their parents in
care, the law does not consistently support confidentiality in the relation-
ships between medical providers and adolescents. In fact, the availability
of confidential relationships between provider and patient is the excep-
tion rather than the norm. 178 Confidentiality certainly cannot be assured
when a parent or caretaker is the only person who can provide consent
for an adolescent's treatment. Therefore, in spite of the Society's deter-
mination that when family involvement is "not in the best interest of the
adolescent or when parental involvement may prevent the adolescent
from seeking care, confidentiality must be assured,' t 79 the law often
does not allow a healthcare provider to make such assurances.
175 See THE SOCIETY FOR ADOLESCENT MEDICINE, Access to Healthcare for Adolescents:
A Position Paper of the Society for Adolescent Medicine, 13 J. OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH 162
(1992).
176 Id.; see also AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, Confidentiality of Care for Teens
Allows Parental Involvement (July 11, 2002), available at http://www.aap.org/advocacy/wash-
ing/confidentiality-care.htm ("[C]oncem about confidentiality is one of the primary reasons
young people delay seeking healthcare services for sensitive issues.... There is evidence that
mandatory parental consent laws may have an adverse impact on some families and that it
increases the risk of medical and psychological harm to adolescents.").
177 THE SOCIETY FOR ADOLESCENT MEDICINE, supra note 175.
178 See supra text accompanying notes 21-48.
179 THE SOCIETY FOR ADOLESCENT MEDICINE, supra note 175.
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The need for proxy consent complicates the relationship between a
healthcare provider and an adolescent patient. The AAP acknowledges
that the concept of proxy consent, generally exemplified by parents con-
senting to care on behalf of their children, is problematic. They write:
Thus "proxy consent" poses serious problems for pediat-
ric healthcare providers. Such providers have legal and
ethical duties to their child patients to render competent
medical care based on what the patient needs, not what
someone else expresses. Although impasses regarding
the interests of minors and the expressed wishes of their
parents or guardians are rare, the pediatrician's responsi-
bilities to his or her patient exist independent of parental
desires or proxy consent. 180
Proxy consent is often inadequate, particularly for adolescent pa-
tients, because it reinforces the idea that adolescents are incapable of
participating in the world around them in a meaningful way. Recogniz-
ing the need to include young patients in decision-making about their
care, the AAP recommends that healthcare providers obtain assent from
their adolescent patients and defines the elements of assent as:
1. Helping the patient achieve developmentally appro-
priate awareness of the nature of his or her condition.
2. Telling the patient what he or she can expect with
tests and treatment(s).
3. Making a clinical assessment of the patients' [sic] un-
derstanding of the situation and the factors influencing
how he or she is responding (including whether there is
inappropriate pressure to accept testing or therapy).
4. Soliciting an expression of the patient's willingness
to accept the proposed care. Regarding this final point,
we note that no one should solicit a patient's views with-
out intending to weigh them seriously. In situations in
which the patient will have to receive medical care de-
spite his or her objection, the patient should be told that
fact and should not be deceived.
1 8 1
180 AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS COMMITTEE ON BIOETHICS, supra note 139, at
315. Interestingly, the healthcare provider who served as a driving force behind the effort to
get the AAP to endorse a statement on children and assent, expressed some dismay about the
position ultimately taken by the organization based on concerns that compromise language in
the document "threaten[ed] to undermine or thwart the basic purpose of the statement" and
could "make... a mockery of the whole idea of assent." William G. Bartholome, Letter to the
Editor, 96 PEDIATRICS 981, 981 (1995).
181 AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS COMMIT-EE ON BIoETHICS, supra note 139, at
315-316.
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Showing similar respect for adolescent assent in treatment, the Soci-
ety writes:
Seeking the assent of a minor who is not legally author-
ized to consent demonstrates respect for the decision-
making skills of a non-autonomous individual to the ex-
tent that he or she is able to participate in the decision.
This is particularly relevant for adolescents who are cog-
nitively mature but below the age of legal majority and
still dependent upon adults for their basic health care de-
cisions. Respect for the decision-making capabilities of
an adolescent demands both confidentiality and
privacy. 182
Assent and the knowledge that it implies are also important because
they help to increase a young person's interest in participating in treat-
ment. For:
In order to achieve maximum compliance,1 83 the patient
must not only be actively involved, but also a participant
in his or her own care. Participation will include discus-
sions related to choice of therapy as well as what mode
of administration such therapy might necessitate ...
The healthcare provider can no longer be the mere ad-
ministrator of treatments, but must become involved in a
relationship marked by mutual respect and concern. 1
84
The ability to give consent, not just assent, specifically in the con-
text of chronic diseases, "may be crucial to carry out a given treatment
protocol. With the acquisition of further knowledge about the child's
disease, the child learns to feel more in control of not only the therapy
but also of his or her life .... A more positive self-image often follows
this sense of body control and this in turn leads to an increase in compli-
ance."1 85 Some healthcare providers that advocate increased healthcare
decision-making rights for adolescents state that integrating young peo-
182 THE SOCIETY FOR ADOLESCENT MEDICINE, A Position Paper of the Society for Adoles-
cent Medicine: Confidential Healthcare for Adolescents, 21 J. OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH 408-
415 (1997).
183 The language of compliance, as used here and in many other medical contexts, has a
negative connotation that I do not support. To the extent that a healthcare provider seeks to
engage in a top-down approach to medicine in which the patient is seen as an object to be
manipulated into compliance with a physician's recommendation, the use of the term is anath-
ema to the type of provider-patient relationship that this proposal imagines and seeks to
encourage.
184 Michael A Grodin & Joel J. Alpert, Informed Consent and Pediatric Care, in Melton
et al., supra note 20, at 103.
185 Id. at 102. See also AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, supra note 95, at 164.
("Children with a variety of chronic disease, including those with cancer, have exhibited better
2005]
298 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14:251
pie into the decision-making process will "(1) increase their ownership of
the decision and encourage them to obtain the necessary follow-up care,
(2) increase their ability to make such decisions in the future, and (3)
perhaps make healthcare less threatening and more attractive to them as
future healthcare consumers."' 86
Assent, as used in the medical context, is a valuable concept without
a comparable legal counterpart. However, even if there were such a con-
cept in the law, it would likely fail to adequately protect and respect
young people. There are at least two important components of healthcare
decision-making. The first component is knowledge, meaning that a per-
son can play no meaningful role in decisions about his own health if he is
not aware of his own health status. The second component is consent,
meaning the ability to make decisions about how to respond to illness.
Granting the right of assent addresses the knowledge component of
healthcare decision-making but does not address the consent component.
To the extent that knowledge and consent are intertwined concepts,
denying either of these prongs to adolescents is certainly problematic.
Granting a right to assent, essentially a right to notice and comment,
must necessarily be seen as secondary to a right to consent187 and does
not fully address the detriment to young people in both tangible and in-
tangible ways that exists as a consequence of a failure to generally recog-
nize their capacity for competent decision-making. Assent still means
that someone other than the adolescent patient has the final, legally rele-
vant say in what course of treatment the patient will pursue. While a
right to assent, or knowledge and input, is certainly better than nothing at
all, such a right does not address issues of confidential care and does not
acknowledge an adolescent's capacity for decision-making in conjunc-
tion with an informed consent dialogue.
III. FIXING THE SYSTEM
Those who have experienced.., irksome constraints jus-
tified wholly on paternalistic grounds, will testify that
their resentment is not mere frustration or antipathy.
Rather it has the full flavor of moral indignation and
coping skills and fewer psychosocial problems when appropriately informed about the nature
and consequences of their illness.").
186 Janet A. Deatrick et al., Children Should Be Seen and Heard, HEALTH PROGRESS,
April 1990, at 76.
187 Assent is secondary to consent in that the former is essentially assumed within the
context of the latter. If a patient is to give legally binding consent to healthcare, a healthcare
provider must first inform the patient of the nature of the illness and the risks and benefits
involved in treatment. If there is only a right to knowledge, then healthcare providers may
have less incentive to engage in in-depth and honest conversations with the adolescent and
focus instead on the parents who will offer consent.
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outrage. Their grievance is not simply that they have
been unnecessarily inconvenienced or "irked," but
rather that in some way they have been violated, in-
vaded, belittled. 1
88
An assumption of general adolescent incapacity, with exceptions for
certain times of crisis that may burden or threaten the public health, does
not recognize young people as autonomous human beings who exist
within family networks in which other parties share an interest in their
lives and health. Recognizing this inter-connectedness, it is possible to
imagine a regime that strikes a balance between the autonomy and de-
pendence of adolescents. On one hand, most of those who are fourteen
and older are mentally or psychologically capable of providing knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary consent for healthcare treatment. Simultane-
ously, the unique relationship between parent and child and the strong
public and legal support for reinforcing, rather then severing, those ties
demands acknowledgement of the emotional and financial dependence
that young people may have and their potential need for support and
guidance in making medical decisions.
Recognizing that the grant of authority for which I advocate is not
without its detractors, this section responds to some of the most conten-
tious issues involved in an attempt to reconfigure adolescents in the eyes
of the law and in the context of healthcare and family structure. First, I
articulate the tenets of the shared-decision-making model which I pro-
pose should apply in the healthcare arena and explain what expanded
rights to knowledge and consent this model confers on young people.
Next, I confront the objections of those who view such a proposal as
unduly interfering with parental rights and explain why the proposal is an
appropriate way to shift the current legal dynamic of power imbalance
between parents, adolescents, and healthcare providers.
A. A MODEL FOR AUTONOMOUS HEALTHCARE DECISION-MAKING BY
ADOLESCENTS
I advocate an alternative conception of the legal personhood of ado-
lescents and a concomitant re-structuring of the allocation of healthcare
decision-making power among family members, specifically parents or
other adult caretakers, and adolescents. In so doing, I join with others
who have urged, "a paradigmatic shift in thinking about adolescence that
entails a legal framework predicated on adolescent decisional ability."
189
Making this shift and "[a]pproaching adolescence from the standpoint of
188 Feinberg, supra note 78, at 27.
189 Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51
HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1269 (2000).
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decisional ability, rather than presumptive decisional incapacity, com-
ports with contemporary social norms, encourages clear rules in contrast
to convoluted exceptions, and optimizes development for meaningful ad-
olescent decision-making."' 90
Cultural evolution, the expansion of scientific knowledge, and re-
spect for the adolescent all provide a valid basis for transforming the
legal landscape to embrace a model of shared healthcare decision-mak-
ing within families. 19' The legal system should support a more balanced
relationship between the goals of protecting adolescents from themselves
and granting them rights that allow them to take actions to protect their
own interests. Striking this balance requires working within the familial
unit and recognizing the power of that unit while avoiding romanticiza-
tion and unattainable aspiration. Rather than a myopic focus on eighteen
as a magic year, more precise and multi-disciplinary thinking suggests
the law should create a younger age at which people have a legal right to
substantially and substantively participate in decisions about their own
healthcare and, in some circumstances, act independently in the health-
care arena. This proposal does not envision or advocate across the board
emancipation from the disabilities of age for young people. Rather, it
focuses on a particular area where adolescent decision-making would ac-
crue to the benefit of the patient.
Any change in the law's treatment of young people in the healthcare
context must start from the premise that children are not monolithic,
meaning that all of those who are legally minors, because they are below
the age of eighteen, should not be labeled immature, incapable, and deci-
sionally dependent. Protectionist policies necessary to maintain the
health of young children-those under the age of fourteen-are not auto-
matically appropriate for adolescents who have the capacity to compre-
hend and respond to their own healthcare circumstances. Either/or
reasoning focused on 100% autonomy or 100% lack of autonomy is an
inappropriate view of the interests at stake here. 192 No member of a
functioning family is radically autonomous and each family member is
regularly called upon to understand her exercise of rights within the
broader context of an impact on family members.
190 Id.
191 This proposal does not advocate a healthcare decision-making model that disregards
the individual and focuses on the family as the patient. To the contrary, I find value in the idea
of recognizing the reality of autonomy that interacts with the interdependence of family con-
nections, but that is not supplanted by those connections. For a discussion of some of the
problems with family medicine, see Martha Minow, Who's the Patient?, 53 MD. L. REV. 1173,
1181-86 (1994).
192 See LAURA M. PURDY, IN THEIR BEST INTEREST 228-229 (Cornell University Press
1992) ("A protectionist approach cognizant of the value of freedom should be able to get
beyond the either/or reasoning (individuals are either fully incompetent or fully responsible)
that has tended to plague the legal treatment of children.").
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As described earlier, the model of autonomy upon which this shared
decision-making model rests is one that embraces rather than ignores the
idea of community, interdependence, and cooperative decision-making.
In this proposal, most of the decision-making will require joint consent
by patient and parent, rather than assent by one and consent by the other.
In this way, the proposal seeks to elevate the adolescent to a position of
greater power while preserving a place for the parent in much of the
healthcare decision-making for adolescents. In some ways, the shared
decision-making model is akin to a learner's permit for healthcare deci-
sion-making. Before young people reach eighteen and are completely
unfettered, at least legally, from parental dominance in healthcare deci-
sion-making, they will have opportunities to share in the process of self-
regulation with both healthcare providers and parents to offer support
and guidance. This graduated process conforms to the idea that making
good decisions is a learned behavior and that "the right kind of growing
up in the law takes place over time rather than on a particular
birthday."1 9
3
As the world changes and adolescents grow up exposed to adult-like
experiences at earlier ages, restricting young people from exercising the
skills they acquire in the course of their own lives as well as lessons they
glean from observing the lives of others is injurious to both their physical
and psychological health. That young people lack life experiences to
draw upon when confronted with difficult decisions is also true of many
young adults or even older adults when faced with a unique or unex-
pected medical crisis. In such circumstances, the lack of experience does
not transform these adults into children who cannot make decisions. In-
stead, we count on their ability to confer with others including friends,
family members, and healthcare providers to make informed choices that
best reflect their outlook on life. The same could be expected of adoles-
cents when given the opportunity to act as decision-makers, along with
their parents, about their own lives and health.
Further, many forces will work to limit the circumstances in which
young people seek care without involving their parents. These forces
include healthcare provider pressure to involve parents, the adolescent
patient's need and desire for support and encouragement from parents in
making decisions, and financial dependence to the extent that it provides
an incentive to involve parents in healthcare decisions. Finally, just as a
healthcare provider could question the decision-making capacity of an
adult who does not appear capable of providing informed consent, the
same option would exist when providing care to young people.
193 FRANK ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 103 (The Free
Press 1982).
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The law can recognize that adolescents are more competent than it
has heretofore acknowledged on a large scale and simultaneously main-
tain a concern that for some young people, lack of life experiences, and
insufficient opportunities to act as the architect of their own lives may
impair their ability to think through all of the ramifications of a given
decision. It may be appropriate, then, to mandate access to certain ser-
vices that will help the young person make difficult life decisions if she
chooses not to enlist her parents help in making those decisions. How-
ever, denying her complete access to independent decision-making is not
the appropriate response to concerns about protecting young people from
their own bad judgment. Ultimately,
To respect a child's autonomy is to treat that child as a
person and as a rights-holder. It is clear that we can do
so to a much greater extent than we have assumed hith-
erto. But it is also clear that the exercising of autonomy
by a child can have a deleterious impact on that child's
life chances. It is true that adults make mistakes too
(and also make mistakes when interfering with a child's
autonomy). Having rights means being allowed to take
risks and make choices.194
The shared decision-making model proposed here affords two levels
of protection for adolescents. The first level is a knowledge tier. This
knowledge tier, like assent as recommended by the AAP and the Society,
seeks to ensure that healthcare providers make a young patient aware of
her own medical condition, its potential impact on her health, available
treatment options, and the risks and benefits of participating or failing to
participate in any particular treatment protocol. As the AAP recognizes,
"Social forces tend to concentrate authority for health care decisions in
the hands of [healthcare providers] and parents and this tendency dimin-
ishes the moral status of children. Thus, those who care for children
need to provide measures to solicit assent and to attend to possible
abuses of 'raw' power over children when ethical conflicts occur."' 195
The second tier, generally unavailable to young people outside the
limited context of the mature minor doctrine or healthcare emancipation
statutes, is a consent tier. The consent tier reinforces the right to knowl-
edge by giving young people the right to consent or refuse to consent to
treatment thus making them partners in decisions about their own health,
which has not been supported or required by the law except in limited
194 FREEMAN, supra note 82, at 36.
195 AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS COMMITrEE ON BIoETHICs, supra note 139, at
317.
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circumstances. More importantly, adolescent consent is valuable for its
own sake because it acknowledges adolescent capacity and autonomy.
State laws on healthcare decision-making for adolescents aged four-
teen to seventeen should rest upon a presumption of decisional capability
commensurate with that of young adults, at least in the context of health-
care decision-making. Therefore, to acknowledge this capacity and en-
sure that young people are given considerable opportunities to participate
in decisions about their own healthcare, it is necessary to articulate a
right to healthcare decision-making for young people ages fourteen and
older that simultaneously supports their inherent right to human dignity,
recognizes their limited experience, and respects the interest of their
parents.
A model statute under this regime would allow a young person who
is at least fourteen years old but less than eighteen years old to access
healthcare and make binding decisions about diagnosis and treatment in
conjunction with her parent or caretaker assuming no objection from the
patient about parental involvement thus triggering exceptions to the pre-
sumption of shared decision-making. In other words, the power to make
decisions would be equally shared by patient and parent. Healthcare in
this context refers to care intended to diagnose or treat medical diseases
or conditions, including psychological ailments. This care would need to
be provided by a licensed medical provider in good standing within the
medical community. Medical care does not refer to care intended only to
provide aesthetic enhancement, including body piercing, tattooing, and
many, though not all, categories of cosmetic surgery.
196
Recognizing that many families are fractured and that there might
be situations in which a patient chose to share information with one par-
ent and not the other, healthcare providers would not be required to ob-
tain the consent of both parents before providing care requested by a
qualifying adolescent patient. Similarly, where a custody determination
had been made, only the custodial parent need participate in healthcare
decision-making for the patient. Importantly, this model encourages the
adolescent patient to decide which adult with decision-making power she
wished to involve in her care. The healthcare provider would then need
to obtain valid informed consent for healthcare from the patient as well
as her preferred adult caretaker.
A primary component of this model is recognition that in most in-
stances young people will be well served, or at least not harmed, by in-
volving an adult caretaker in their healthcare decision-making process.
However, just as many state statutes already recognize, there are some
196 Cosmetic surgery intended to alleviate a physical or mental disease or condition might
be an appropriate context to allow a young person to make informed decisions about
healthcare.
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circumstances in which it is appropriate and perhaps necessary to allow a
young person to make decisions without the knowledge or consent of an
adult caretaker. Thus, this proposed model incorporates three primary
exceptions to the baseline requirement of shared decision-making be-
tween the adolescent patient and the adult caretaker of her choosing.
First, if a young person balks at including parents in decision-mak-
ing, the healthcare provider shall respect the wishes of the adolescent
patient and provide care without the knowledge or consent of a parent or
other adult caretaker. An approach that allows young people to deter-
mine the level of involvement of adult caretakers is already the road
taken in some state statutes, allowing young people to make healthcare
decisions related to pregnancy, STIs, substance abuse treatment, and
mental health treatment.197 Under such a model, a young woman seek-
ing an abortion who did not wish to involve parents in her decision-
making would not be compelled to do so. Of course, if the healthcare
provider determines that the young person is not capable of making deci-
sions because of mental health concerns, immaturity, or some other form
of incapacity that precludes the patient from understanding a diagnosis or
proposed treatment even when explained in a manner appropriate to the
patient's age and intelligence level, the physician should seek out another
decision maker for the patient.
Second, a healthcare provider need not stand by and watch an ado-
lescent make a decision with a substantial risk of resulting in death or
permanent impairment without seeking to involve an adult decision-
maker. Even though the patient has decisionmaking capacity, the physi-
cian may seek out parental involvement where the decision being made
by the young patient posed the potential for dire consequences for a
young patient.
Third, if a parent lacks capacity to consent to care for a young per-
son because of a lack of maturity, mental health concerns, or some other
form of incapacity, then a healthcare provider may rely solely upon the
informed consent of the decisionally capable young person. Each of
these exceptions will be discussed in greater depth in the sections that
follow.
B. THE ROLE OF THE FAMILY: THE ADOLESCENT PATIENT
Under the shared decision-making model envisioned here, an ado-
lescent patient would be a central component of any decision-making
process regarding her own health. Only in rare circumstances would that
patient be denied the opportunity to play an integral role in decisions
being made about her own health.
197 See supra text accompanying notes 39-48.
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The adolescent patient has many responsibilities under this model.
In some instances, she will be responsible for identifying a healthcare
provider and identifying her own need for healthcare. As a patient, she
could demand that her healthcare provider offer her an opportunity or
opportunities for private and confidential conversations with the health-
care provider even if a parent or caretaker has accompanied the young
person to the healthcare provider's office. These private conversations
would afford the young person the opportunity to share thoughts with the
healthcare provider that she might not wish to share with her parent or
caretaker for any number of reasons. Further, in the context of these
private conversations, the young person would have the opportunity to
disclose concerns that she might have about involving her parent or care-
taker in her ongoing medical decisions. Without permission from the
young person, the context of the conversations should remain
confidential.
Where a young person did not object to including a parent in her
decision-making process, she would be responsible for identifying that
person and letting the physician know that this was the individual with
whom she would share decision-making power. At that point, along with
her parent or caretaker, the adolescent patient would be responsible for
listening to information offered by a healthcare provider, seeking clarity
where needed, and participating in decision-making about appropriate
treatment based on her desires and wishes. Thus, in consultation with a
trusted adult and a healthcare provider, an adolescent patient would play
a central, if not defining, role in decisions about her own health.
To the extent that a patient did not wish to have a parent know about
or consent to care on her behalf, she would need to demonstrate her abil-
ity to make independent decisions and articulate her concerns about hav-
ing her parent or caretaker involved in decisions about her healthcare.
The threshold for parental exclusion should be set low meaning that the
young person would not have to offer proof of detriment but need only
articulate a reasoned desire not to involve a parent in decision-making.
Where a young person sought to access care without the knowledge
or consent of an adult caretaker, she would not only need to possess
decision-making capacity, but she might also need to demonstrate to the
provider that she is capable of paying for the services sought. Being
afforded the right to make a broad category of healthcare decisions with-
out parental knowledge or consent might appear to offer little to those
adolescents who would be unable to access care without relying on the
financial resources of their parents and perhaps these young people
would in fact feel that the law continued to do them a disservice. How-
ever, the fact that all of those who might possess a right might lack the
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financial resources to exercise that right does not make the right less
worthy of existence.
For many young people, the right to shared decision-making with
parents or caregivers, except in limited circumstances, will not mean that
they will routinely seek to access care without the knowledge and con-
sent of parents. Instead, the baseline presumption is one of parent and
patient sharing the emotional and intellectual responsibility of care with
an understanding that in most families the financial burden will belong to
the parent. Thus, parents will be in a position in which they or their
insurance provider will cover the cost of healthcare for the adolescent.
Where the need is great enough, resourceful young people will find
the means to pay for care that they need but are unwilling to share infor-
mation about with their parents. Already, in the context of abortion and
STI treatment, young women who seek to terminate pregnancies without
the knowledge or consent of their parents and young people who seek
treatment for STIs must find the financial resources to pay for their own
care.' 98 Lack of financing does not mean that the right should be with-
held. To the extent that young people seek out health care for which they
cannot pay and which they do not wish to discuss with their parents, it
may be appropriate to allow them access to public benefits programs that
can cover the cost of their healthcare. 199 Similarly, physicians may wish
198 The question of financial responsibility for healthcare provided to a minor can become
complicated at times. When parents consent to care, "they are invariable legally responsible
for payment of the value of that care." MORRISSEY ET AL., supra note 15, at 142. However,
where a statute authorizes a minor to consent to care or the minor is emancipated and indepen-
dently consents to care, he bears financial responsibility for that care. Id. at 143. Thus, "it is
unlikely that the parents would be held liable for payment for services to which they did not
consent unless they affirmatively agreed to do so." Id. (citation omitted). The harder case is
when a minor is not emancipated and seeks care without parental approval. In such a case, it
has been suggested that "generally, the parents of a minor living at home can be held liable for
necessary medical services rendered to that minor-even if they have not given their con-
sent-provided they are financially able to do so." Id. Of course, this begs the question of
what type of care falls under the rubric of necessary. The author's description of the law in
this arena suggests that where a minor sought and received care that was "unnecessary," the
parents could not be held financially liable for that care. Also, where a young person deliber-
ately sought care without parental consent or knowledge, he would assume financially respon-
sibility for that care or be forced to share information about that care with his parents. "In
summary, minors consenting to their own health care are, in almost all circumstances, liable
for payment. Under more limited circumstances, such as emergency care, parents could also
be looked to for payment even if they did not first consent to treatment." Id. at 144.
199 In the context of emergency healthcare as required by the Emergency Medical Treat-
ment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), the AAP writes, "Although state and federal pro-
grams exist to pay for children's health care needs, uncompensated charges may result from
the EMTALA requirement of treatment for all without regard to payment. The [Emergency
Department] should ensure that the financial issues surrounding a patient's treatment do not
result in a breach of patient confidentiality, particularly if an unintended parental notification
may result from the receipt of an itemized medical bill. The healthcare provider should dis-
cuss these ramifications of unaccompanied care with the minor patient as appropriate for the
patient's level of maturity and understanding and seek assent from the patient for parental
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to refer patients to facilities that provide care on a sliding scale, may be
willing to set up payment plans for young patients, or may even choose
to provide low or no-cost services in some cases.
200
Some would also decry the increased pressure placed on adolescents
by this proposal because it may require them to participate in conversa-
tions with which they are uncomfortable or that require complex deci-
sion-making. First, the proposal involves young people in a variety of
decision-making processes thus giving them opportunities to "practice"
their skills in less charged environments and making them more likely to
make informed, reasoned decisions when faced with more challenging
questions.
Second, increasing autonomy is a step in the process of moral devel-
opment for young people:
Both cognitive-developmental and social learning theo-
rists emphasize that significance of participation in role-
taking in determining the rate of moral development.
Essentially, moral-development theorists conceptualize
achievement of milestones in cognitive development as
necessary but not sufficient for progress in moral devel-
opment. For example, from a cognitive developmental
perspective, formal operational thought (the capacity to
think abstractly) is necessary for the attainment of prin-
cipled moral reasoning. However, attainment of such
reasoning based on abstract ethical principles also re-
quires extensive experience with resolving ethical
problems in social interaction and exposure to diverse,
"higher" points of view. 201
Thus, by allowing young people to give consent to routine care, we cre-
ate better healthcare consumers over the long-term.
By requiring that young people play an active role in discussions
and decisions about their own healthcare, this proposal seeks not only to
impact the actions of parents and healthcare providers, but also to create
opportunities for positive growth and acceptance of self-regulation in
young people.20 2 While the burden created here may be heavy in some
involvement, as may be required by patient privacy laws in some states, or honor the patient's
wish for confidential care." AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, Policy Statement, Consent
for Emergency Medical Services for Children and Adolescents, 111 PEDIATRICS 703, 704
(2003) (citations omitted).
200 MORRISSEY ET AL., supra note 15, at 147.
201 Gary B. Melton, Decision Making by Children, in Melton et al., supra note 20, at 27
(citations omitted).
202 "As suggested by deCharms [sic] findings, there is reason to believe that increased
autonomy would increase children's performance in those spheres in which they had the op-
portunity to make choices. For example, the affirmative act of making a choice might induce
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circumstances, that burden is part of autonomy, and we do not aid ado-
lescents in learning how to direct their own destiny if we are afraid of
giving them control over that destiny. By placing them on equal footing
with their parents, the law teaches young people lessons about intra-fam-
ily respect and lessens reliance on outdated notions of parental
dominance.
C. THE ROLE OF THE FAMILY: THE PARENT OR CARETAKER
As currently configured, the law privileges parents over their ado-
lescent children when it comes to making healthcare decisions. As such,
where there is a conflict between parent and adolescent about appropriate
healthcare treatment, the parent's wish would generally take precedence
over the preferences of the young person. A shared decision-making
model as described in this article encourages and supports conversation
and compromise between parent and child. Under this model, in most
circumstances, a parent would continue to possess a right and obligation
to consent to care for his child which would involve listening to informa-
tion offered by a healthcare provider, seeking clarity where needed, and
participating in decision-making about appropriate treatment based not
only on his desires, but also with appreciation of the wishes and needs of
the adolescent patient. Thus, both patient and parent would be privy to
information about the patient's health and would make an appropriate
decision about care and treatment in consultation with each other and
with the healthcare provider.
In some set of cases, parents would not be involved in care because
of a decisionally capable patient's request to exclude parents from deci-
sion-making about healthcare. Physicians would be obliged to honor
such requests, except to the extent that the young person sought to make
a decision with a substantial certainty of leading to death or permanent
impairment.
In those rare cases in which a patient and parent disagreed about an
appropriate course, the parent would not be without recourse. As an ini-
tial option, the parent could acquiesce in the patient's position and trust
that that the patient has made the most appropriate decision for herself.
Assuming that this option was not satisfactory, the parent might also con-
cognitive dissonance if a child did not follow through on an educational or treatment program
to which he or she had consented. Choice results in increased perceived value of the chosen
object or event. Consequently, the freedom to decide might increase the child's motivation to
perform well in the program. Furthermore, to the extent to which such programs are in them-
selves stressful, participation in the decision-making process might serve as an 'innoculation'
against the stress to follow and increase the probability of the child's sustained involvement in
the program. In this regard, Holmes and Urie (1975) found that a preparatory interview to
establish and discuss expectations for psycho-therapy reduced premature terminations among
children aged 6 to 12." Id. at 30-31.
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tinue to engage in discussion with the patient and perhaps seek third
party assistance to help mediate the disagreement. Barring the success of
this option, the parent might also seek legal intervention in the conflict,
an option that will be discussed further in a subsequent section.
While a parent might seek to use threats to engage an adolescent in
needed healthcare, many parents already recognize that treating young
people with respect, including seeking out and actively responding to
their concerns, is a much more worthwhile means of engaging them. En-
listing the cooperation of a young person in any course of treatment is
also worthwhile given the opportunities for sabotaging treatment that can
arise when such treatment does not take place in a monitored setting.
Young people can opt not to take doses of medication while away from
their parents, can eat foods that they have been told to avoid, and can
engage in a range of other behaviors that undermine treatment provided
to them. Thus, in the interest of family harmony and the maximization
.of benefit, it makes sense to provide young people with a clear legal
mechanism for reinforcing a worthwhile family dynamic.
D. THE HEALTHCARE PROVIDER'S ROLE
The role of the healthcare provider articulated here is undoubtedly a
central one and one filled with pressures and difficulties, as is true of the
roles played by the parent and the patient. However, the role of the
healthcare provider in providing care to a young patient is, at its core,
always a delicate one when performed within the confines of profes-
sional duties and ethics.
Any healthcare provider working with a patient aged fourteen to
seventeen would seek the consent of both patient and parent for purposes
of diagnosis and treatment of any medical ailment and would document
that consent in whatever manner she normally would use to document
parental consent. Therefore, for routine care that would normally not
mandate written consent, oral consent from patient and parent would
continue to be appropriate. For other types of care for which the health-
care provider normally required written consent, such consent would be
secured from patient and parent.
As is the case with adults and healthcare treatment, a healthcare
provider would need to ensure that consent was informed before pro-
ceeding with any type of healthcare treatment, 20 3 which would require an
initial finding that the young person has decision-making capacity. Spe-
203 Many commentators have raised questions about the concept of informed consent in
the context of healthcare for adults. See, e.g., JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND
PATIENT 48-84 (1984) (discussing the history of the informed consent requirement and the
difficulties of making such a requirement actually work to the benefit of patients). While a
critique of informed consent is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that provid-
2005]
310 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14:251
cifically, the healthcare provider must assess the young person's ability
to offer consent that is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Importantly,
a healthcare provider need not make a global determination on decision-
making capacity, but may find that a young person is capable of making
some decisions and not others. 20 4 Further, the required level of capacity
may increase based on the seriousness of the illness or treatment being
discussed. 20
5
Informed consent, as is required for all adult patients, would man-
date that the physician provide information about the patient's condition
and the risks and benefits of any proposed healthcare course of action.
206
The healthcare provider would need to provide this information in a
manner appropriate to the age and ability of the patient and in language
understandable to the patient. This is no different from requiring that a
healthcare provider ensure that a patient with a language barrier or a
patient who is hearing or sight impaired is provided with the proper tools
to understand information conveyed in an informed consent process and
freely consents to healthcare.
Where a physician is working with a patient and an adult caretaker
or parent and the adolescent patient lacks decision-making capacity, it
would be appropriate to allow the adult to provide singular consent for
treatment of the adolescent patient with the understanding that this would
not mean that the adolescent patient did not have the right to continue to
be apprised of her condition and encouraged to at least provide assent to
treatment even if consent was inappropriate.
The more difficult circumstance would be where the adolescent who
lacked decision-making capacity requested that the healthcare provider
refrain from sharing information about her health status with her parent
or guardian. Where a decision would have innocuous consequences or
could be delayed in the interest of ongoing discussion with the adoles-
cent patient, it is unlikely that the healthcare provider would feel obli-
gated to disclose information to parents that a patient shared in
ers would need to ensure that they engaged in conversations with adolescents that were appro-
priate to the patient's age, maturity, and level of intelligence.
204 Given that decision-making capacity is made "in reference to a particular decision, it
may, in some patients, be considered adequate to make some decisions but not others." Id. at
462; see also Judith Ann Erlen, The Child's Choice: An Essential Component in Treatment
Decisions, 15 CHILDREN'S HEALTH CARE 156, 156 (Winter 1987) ("In other words, there is
variable competence, with competence no longer considered to be an either/or concept."); Eu-
gene C. Grochowski & Shirley Bach, The Ethics of Decision Making with Adolescents: What a
Healthcare Provider Ought to Know, 5 ADOLESCENT MED. 485, 487(October 1994) ("Thus, at
any given time, a patient may have the capacity to make a simple, straightforward medical
decision but not a more complex one.").
205 "The more serious the consequences of decisions, the more rigorous the evaluation
and standards for [decision-making capacity] should be." Lantos & Miles, supra note 28, at
462.
206 AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 171.
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confidence, but she would also not be obligated to provide care to a pa-
tient who could not offer valid consent. 20 7 Where the patient lacking
decision-making capacity sought to make a decision potentially leading
to death or permanent impairment, the physician should have a profes-
sional and legal obligation to seek out parental or other adult guidance
for the young person. This discretion should not be used to simply usurp
the independent decision-making of a minor with decision-making ca-
pacity who simply disagrees with her healthcare provider.
In some circumstances, a parent, rather than the patient, may appear
to a physician to lack decision-making capacity. This situation might
arise with a parent with a substance abuse problem or mental illness.
Here, it would be appropriate for the physician to provide treatment
based solely on the informed consent of the adolescent patient with deci-
sion-making capacity rather than resorting to court intervention.
20 8
While it would not be appropriate for a healthcare provider to sim-
ply substitute his judgment for that of the parent or patient based on
some evaluation of the patient's best interest, it is not inappropriate to
ask a provider to evaluate, as she would with an adult patient, whether
the decision being made by the patient or surrogate decision-maker was
being made freely, with understanding of consequences and appreciation
for alternative options.
Confidentiality and the trust bred by providing access to confiden-
tial healthcare must remain a cornerstone of providing care for young
people. Recognizing that there is an "inherent duality during the adoles-
cent years"20 9 in which "the young person is both a dependent member
of the family unit and an increasingly emancipated individual who is
moving into the outside world, '2 10 the grant of confidentiality "is some-
thing more than a pragmatic response to protective needs; it also conveys
recognition of and respect for the young person's emergent auton-
omy. '21 1 Healthcare providers should seek to involve parents in deci-
sion-making about adolescents unless the healthcare provider determines
that breaching the patient's confidentiality may prevent the young person
from seeking care or might place the young person at risk for violence or
207 In fact, where an adolescent seems to lack decision-making capacity, it could be ar-
gued that a healthcare provider would violate her duty to the patient by accepting a consent
that she knew to be invalid.
208 In such a situation, a healthcare provider who has a statutory obligation to report abuse
or neglect might be obligated to report the parent to the appropriate child services agency. See,
e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-507 (2003) (requiring healthcare providers and others to report
suspected child abuse); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-101 (defining various healthcare providers as
mandated reporters of suspected abuse). However, court adjudication would not be necessary
in order for decisions to be made about the patient's healthcare.
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other adverse consequences at the hands of the parent or guardian. 212 In
such cases, the healthcare provider should be entitled to provide care to
the young person without seeking the consent of a parent of caretaker
unless the young person's decision would, with substantial certainty, lead
to death or permanent disfigurement. Such an exception comports with
the AAP's position that "it is necessary and appropriate for the health-
care provider to inform a parent when there is a life-threatening emer-
gency with their child"2 13 though "in most circumstances there is a
critical need to ensure that an adolescent's heath information is
protected." 21
4
Where there is conflict between the parents and the patient, the
healthcare provider should work to promote dialogue among family
members and seek consensus about proceeding with treatment. It may be
necessary to refer the family for supportive services or counseling to help
them work through their conflict in a manner that ultimately benefits all
parties. To the extent that physicians are not connected to such net-
works, this proposal recommends that such outreach occur. Undoubt-
edly, there are those healthcare providers who will be uncomfortable
with playing the role of counselor and mediator, but their obligation to
their patients includes providing appropriate referrals when possible and
necessary.
To protect those who provide care to young people, the failure to
inform a parent about care being provided to a young person could not,
standing alone, establish that a healthcare provider breached a duty to a
parent or an adolescent patient. The expectation in the regime envi-
sioned by the current proposal is that healthcare providers will inform
patients of a preference for shared decision-making while making clear
that a decisionally-capable patient may choose confidential care. !n such
a system, a physician should not be liable for following the wishes of a
competent adolescent patient and would not be liable to parents by virtue
of maintaining confidentiality where a patient made such a request as-
suming no serious risk of death or permanent impairment. Similarly, an
adolescent patient could seek redress for negligence in the provision of
care but could not seek damages based solely upon a physician's deci-
sion to notify a parent where a life threatening or permanently impairing
condition was involved and/or the patient lacked decision-making capac-
ity. Liability, of course, could continue to be premised upon a showing
of actual negligence in the care provided.
While the burden placed on healthcare providers in this regime may
seem excessive, and perhaps inappropriate to some, in practice it asks
212 SOCIETY FOR ADOLESCENT MEDICINE, supra note 175.
213 AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, supra note 176.
214 Id.
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healthcare providers to act in accordance with ethical and professional
standards that have not yet been fully embraced by the law. Some prov-
iders describe the ethical obligation of a healthcare provider caring for an
adolescent patient in stark terms. Where a patient evidences decision-
making capacity, a healthcare provider "is obliged to determine and re-
spect the preferences of that patient. '215 Where a patient lacks decision-
making capacity, "healthcare providers are obliged to provide protection
against decisions by patients, families, or institutions that are not in the
patient's best interest. '216 These authors also provide guidance on the
ethical obligation of a healthcare provider where a patient or his family
refuses treatment, writing, "[r]efusal by an adolescent is acceptable only
if they [sic] show understanding of the implications of their decision.
Unwillingness on the part of adolescent patients or their parents to enter
into discussions about the risks and benefits of therapy makes informed
refusal impossible. ' 21 7 The ethical pronouncements obviously create a
significant burden on a physician working with adolescents that man-
dates evaluating the capacity of the adolescent and her family and re-
sponding to requests for or against treatment accordingly.
J. Roswell Gallagher, an early practitioner of adolescent medicine,
clearly saw the role of adolescent healthcare providers as one that re-
quired the taking on of a difficult and delicate role in the life of a young
person. As described by one historian:
Gallagher argued that physicians who treated this age
group [adolescents] should not only recognize the ado-
lescent's natural need for independence, but should use
the doctor-patient relationship as a way of facilitating
adolescent individuation. In the process, Gallagher cre-
ated a new role for physicians. Not only would doctors
provide adolescents with good health care, they would
also serve as guides on the arduous path toward
adulthood. 218
A healthcare provider's ethical and professional obligation to a pa-
tient will always require a delicate balancing of interests and may some-
times require a healthcare provider to assume an uncomfortable role as
an advocate, mediator, counselor, and confidante. 219 These are roles that
215 Lantos & Miles, supra note 28, at 462.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 463.
218 PREscoTT, supra note 16, at 76.
219 One physician explains:
Decisions about the best course of therapy for a child often involve issues beyond
medicine. A child's social structure, environment, and parental involvement all af-
fect these decisions. The physician is placed in the role of an advocate for the child.
Although this advocacy role is somewhat uncomfortable at times, it is one of the
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the healthcare provider must play even where the law seems to provide
black and white answers about how to proceed in the face of a parent-
child conflict. This proposal gives the healthcare provider wider latitude
to act in accordance with her professional judgment without untoward
interference by the law.
E. THE ROLE OF THE STATE & THE COURTS
Under the shared decision-making model offered here, the option of
seeking a court order would remain available for a parent or provider
who felt that a young person or parent was making a decision that would
ultimately work to her detriment. This option should be exercised spar-
ingly and with caution. Referrals for family counseling or mediation
might be a more appropriate option where families are willing, time is
not of the essence, and violence is not an issue. As healthcare providers
have noted, the availability of the resort to court "allows healthcare prov-
iders to intervene along a spectrum from recommendation to persuasion
to coercion. This power must be used responsibly, and should not be
taken as license to ignore patients with the capacity to make
decisions., 22
0
When faced with a difficult decision about treatment for an adoles-
cent, a judge should engage in ethical decision-making meaning that she
should "decid[e] cases not on the basis of personal experiences, societal
beliefs, or personal assessments about 'how things should be' but on the
facts presented in court, the law as it has developed, and on scientific
rather than conventional wisdom regarding life around [her]."'22' Though
courts are given little guidance about how to make such an assessment,
the evaluation would essentially be a "mature minor" assessment. The
court's goal should be to determine whether the adolescent has the ca-
pacity for mature and thoughtful decision-making and can therefore
make a treatment decision that is informed, intelligent, and voluntary.
An adolescent would need to show that she could articulate her health
problem and its consequences as well as indicate an understanding of the
available treatment options and why she has made a particular decision
about that treatment. Only where a young person lacks decision-making
features of medicine as a profession, rather than the merely technical exercise of
human body repair and maintenance.
Daniel A. Beals, Bioethics in Pediatric Practice, June 30, 2004, available at http://
www.emedicine.com/ped/topic2769.htm.
220 Lantos & Miles, supra note 28, at 466.
221 Mlyniec, supra note 149, at 1874. While I agree that judges must be aware of and
take into consideration the available scientific and medical evidence, it is similarly important
to evaluate the more amorphous details of family dynamics and psycho-social issues that are
also critically important to any evaluation of the emotional and physical impact of an order in a
family court case involving a medical treatment dispute.
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capacity should a court make a determination as to what course of action
would be in that young person's best interest.
A court faced with evaluating the competency of an adolescent
should seek appropriate expert testimony from those who work with ado-
lescents to aid in determining whether the particular adolescent possesses
the appropriate level of capacity to allow her to make independent
healthcare decisions. The court should also consider the seriousness of
the patient's illness and the recommended treatment with a particular fo-
cus on whether the young person's decision would be irreversible and
substantially certain to result in death or permanent impairment. Thus, in
extreme cases, there would continue to be a mechanism protecting young
people from rash or poorly conceived decisions.
Given the charge to decide ethically and assess the competency of
the minor rather than the popularity of her decision, in a case in which a
young person sought lifesaving or curative treatment to which the parents
refused agreement, it is unlikely that a court would side with the parents
as against the young person. Similarly, where the court found that a
young person was refusing life saving or curative care with benefits that
outweighed its risks, treatment would also likely be ordered. This, of
course, differs from the applicable standard for adult patients, which al-
lows a competent adult to refuse treatment that is life saving or cura-
tive.222 In such extreme circumstances, the need to ensure the advanced
decision-making capacity of the young patient is heightened. Thus, a
compromise in this area reflects the recognition that there may be a small
set of circumstances in which youth should preclude a patient from mak-
ing a deadly or permanently impairing decision.
This proposal views state intervention as a failure and as an option
of very last resort. State involvement in intrafamily disputes calls for the
interference of strangers who seek to impose their vision of the world on
a deeply personal conflict between parent and child. Where the law in-
vests rights in an adolescent, resorting to state intervention may not be-
come necessary because, in the appropriate case, the healthcare provider
can form the same patient-healthcare provider relationship that would be
formed with an adult patient. Third party intervention would only be
necessary if the healthcare provider feared that the patient lacked deci-
sion-making capacity. Unlike state action, vesting an adolescent with
rights does not intrude on what would otherwise be a private relationship.
Although the parents may wish to pursue court action to enforce a desire
to direct the care provided to their child, such state intervention would
happen at the bequest of, rather than in opposition to, the wishes of the
222 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 262 (1990); see
also In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976).
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parents. Therefore, the parents would retain some power over the direc-
tion of their family.
One could argue that allowing state interference places a neutral
party between parent and child. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that
the state, as embodied by its child welfare system and the myriad actors
who play a role in that system, has the capacity for neutrality. 223 Thus,
the choice of offering greater protection to a right to autonomous health-
care decision-making for adolescents already existing in piecemeal fash-
ion offers significant opportunities for, among other things, enhancing
respect for families, not just parents, encouraging growth and expanding
the self-sufficiency of adolescents, and lessening the threat of state inter-
vention in families.
F. THE MODEL IN PRACTICE
In practice, the relationships between many providers, adolescent
patients, and parents would not go through radical changes to the extent
that the patient was already the center of the relationship and included as
a partner in decision-making. Where such cooperation was not the case,
physicians and parents would have an obligation, now legal as well as
ethical, to ensure that a young patient was an equal decision-maker in her
own healthcare. It seems likely that circumstances would continue to
exist in which young people with certain health issues, specifically preg-
nancy, STIs, substance abuse or mental health issues, would still seek out
confidential care with a healthcare provider and provide consent for their
own care, assuming that they harbor decision-making capacity as as-
sessed by the treating healthcare provider. Under such a regime, it would
also be possible for young women to access abortion services without
obtaining parental consent or a judicial bypass, reflecting ongoing recog-
nition of the unique nature of a decision to carry a pregnancy to term or
to seek an abortion.
Under this shared decision-making model, where both parent and
adolescent agree on a course of action, either favoring or rejecting the
advice of a physician, both parties get their wish.224 Where an adoles-
223 See Carol B. Stack, Cultural Perspectives on Child Welfare, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 539 (1983-1984) (discussing the ways in which class and cultural issues con-
tinue to raise difficult questions in the child welfare context); Dorothy Roberts, Racial Harm,
COLOR LINES, Sept. 2002, at 45 (describing racism in the nation's child welfare system); see
also Alice M. Hines et al., Factors Related to the Disproportionate Involvement of Children of
Color in the Child Welfare System: A Review and Emerging Themes, 26 CHILD. AND YOUTH
SERVICES REV. 507 (2004) (discussing the overrepresentation of children of color in the child
welfare system).
224 This assumes, of course, that the parties are not making a decision that the physicians
feels is medical neglect thereby triggering an obligation to report to child welfare authorities
and potentially leading to a family court proceeding and a treatment order issued by a court.
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cent possesses decision-making capacity and requests that her parents not
be involved in particular healthcare decisions, the physician should re-
spect that choice, assuming that the patient's decision does not carry a
substantial risk of death or permanent impairment. However, where
there is disagreement between competent decision-makers, with either
the parent or the adolescent expressing a wish not to participate in a
course of treatment, no treatment can take place pending subsequent ac-
tions to reach an agreement or, in a worst-case scenario, a court order.
This provides incentive for families to work together to reach consensus
and may prevent a young person from being subjected to care to which
she objects. Rather than letting a parent or young person unilaterally
make a decision, a model of shared family decision-making elevates the
moral status of the young person by acknowledging her decision-making
capacity, while recognizing that adult guidance may be in her best
interest.
A shared decision-making model avoids extremes in healthcare de-
cision-making for adolescents. It rejects a vision of a familial unit in
which parents are paramount, barring decisions that work to the detri-
ment of young people, but also rejects the idea that most adolescents
would not benefit from the participation of an adult in decisions about
healthcare. The vision of family upon which this proposal rests is one of
families as cooperative units in which young people are confronted with
both the burdens and benefits of being a rights-bearing player in the
healthcare arena. An adolescent's obvious interest in her own health,
combined with her growing capacity to understand her health situation,
evaluate alternatives based on her own value system, and articulate her
healthcare preferences, must coexist with a parent's interest in protecting
the child.
The form of autonomy granted to young people in this context is
grounded in connectedness and community. Therefore, it seeks to in-
clude parents or caretakers as a vital component of healthcare decision-
making for adolescents while according greater respect to the young per-
son as a thinking entity with an inherent right to be intimately involved
in any decisions made concerning her own health.
IV. IN DEFENSE OF SHARED DECISION-MAKING FOR
ADOLESCENT HEALTHCARE
A family-centered approach considers the effects of a de-
cision on all family members, their responsibilities to-
ward one another and the burdens and benefits of a
20051
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decision for each member, while acknowledging the spe-
cial vulnerability of the child patient.225
There are many reasons why different constituencies might object to
a shared decision-making model for adolescent healthcare decision-mak-
ing. The strongest objection would likely come from parents concerned
both for the health of their children and the deterioration of their parental
authority. This section tackles the issue of parental authority and the
state's interest in preserving that authority.
A. RATIONAL LIMITS ON THE RIGHT TO CARE AND CUSTODY
One cannot reasonably discuss extending greater rights to adoles-
cents without acknowledging that extending such rights necessarily im-
pacts, while not necessarily undermining, the rights afforded to the
parent or guardian. As one commentator explained:
When there is a question regarding access to medical
treatment for an adult, the focus is sharply on the rela-
tionship of the individuals to the state. The debate is
usually framed in terms of the proper imposition of the
state's parens patriae power over individual autonomy.
When minors are involved, however, the interests and
capacities of the parents are also a central concern. The
effect of policy and case law must be assessed in a
broader framework, with simultaneous consideration
given to the individual minor's rights, to parental rights
and family integrity, and to the state's duties and
powers. 2
26
As such, parental rights are a necessary part of any analysis of ex-
tending rights to young people. How to strike a balance between the
rights of parents and the rights and needs of young people is an ongoing
puzzle, in part because the realities of the lives of adolescents continue to
change and evolve with the culture. As one observer writes:
[S]ociety and the law face a central conundrum in defin-
ing and regulating families. Society clings to traditional
images of childhood, but the social and cultural universe
within which those images made sense and could, in the-
ory at least, be actualized, has largely disappeared. Al-
though society continues to voice a strong commitment
to traditional notions of childhood, the world within
which actual children function and develop contrasts
225 Harrison et al., supra note 103, at 826.
226 Britner et al., supra note 27, at 37.
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dramatically and increasingly with the world of the tradi-
tional family. As a result the ethic of nineteenth-and
early twentieth-century domestic life still predominates
in social understanding of childhood, but the domestic
world to which that ethic once attached itself no longer
exists. The lives of actual children can be harmonized
less and less often with social images of childhood. In
consequence, the difficulty of preserving the ethic of
childhood without familiar social anchors is evident.
227
In other words, while the law regulates the adolescents of another
era, today's young people face challenges and seek out experiences at
younger ages and with more devastating consequences. This truth
presents a key part to evaluating the parental role in adolescent
decisionmaking.
It is also important to acknowledge that while the shared decision-
making model proposed in this article would impact the rights of parents,
that impact need not be negative. As one advocate for children explains,
"The provision of human rights is not a zero sum game; acknowledging
that children have human rights serves to strengthen, rather than to di-
minish, the human rights of their parents.
228
Children and adolescents do not live outside of the purview of the
Constitution, as the Supreme Court has held on several occasions.
229
The Justices wrote in 1976: "Constitutional Rights do not mature and
come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and
possess constitutional rights.
'230
Arguably, the decisionally capable minor's claim to a right to con-
trol her body, Constitutional or otherwise, is stronger than the right to
custody and control asserted by a parent and the state's power to protect
its vulnerable citizens. Long ago, the Supreme Court wisely acknowl-
edged that a child is "not the mere creature of the State.
' 231 By the same
token, an adolescent is not the mere creature of her parents. She pos-
sesses an inherent right to bodily integrity, independent of any rights her
parents acquire by virtue of possessing the title of parents and the rights
227 Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of Children and the Parent-
Child Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REV. 345, 419 (1997).
228 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood: A Child-Centered Per-
spective on Parents' Rights, 5 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 313, 315 (Summer 1998).
229 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S.
503, 511 (1969) ("Students in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our Constitu-
tion. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they
themselves must respect their obligations to the State.").
230 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
231 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
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and responsibilities that come with that title. Further, scientific studies
show that she is, at least theoretically, capable of wielding these rights in
positive and self-protective ways. 232 The individual right to determine
one's own fate and the fundamental role that this right plays in determin-
ing personhood cannot be underestimated. Allowing parents to usurp the
right of self-determination belonging to a decisionally-capable young
person denies the young person an essential component of.her humanity.
To the extent that one believes that adolescents are in fact compe-
tent decision-makers, that fact standing alone may be sufficient to war-
rant lowering the age of healthcare consent. For:
When a child demonstrates the capacity for effective
choice in a certain context and with regard to some ac-
tion of decision, then the child has a claim to some de-
gree of control over that action or decision. The claim
holds against those who are in the position of responding
to the decision and who are also charged with protecting
the child's best interests. Respecting a child's claim to
control entails allowing the child to exercise her liberty,
to make significant choices, or to direct her affairs, and
for others to comply accordingly. 233
However, there may be other reasons why, even in the face of deci-
sion-making capacity, young people should not make their own health-
care decisions. One of the strongest arguments in this regard is that
extending rights to young people is an attempt to equalize players in a
parent-child relationship that has an inherent element of dependence.
Such an attempt to equalize can only lead to fragmentation, conflict, and
confusion. Fragmentation, however, is most likely within family units
that are already on the brink of fracture. 234 As noted by Dr. Renee Jen-
kins in testimony before Congress on behalf of the AAP, "Research has
232 See supra text accompanying notes 124-141.
233 Bellon, supra note 144, at 113.
234 Hyman Rodman, Understanding the United States Supreme Court's Position on Pa-
rental Consent Requirements: In Defense of Danforth and Bellotti. A Response to Crutchfield,
30 FAMILY RELATIONS 183 (1981) ("Parents are more likely to be consulted in a harmonious
family with good parent-child relationships. But if family harmony is lacking, and if parent-
child relationships are poor, should the state insist upon parental consent or parental notifica-
tion in order to 'maintain' something that is not there."); see also Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52, 76 (1976) ("It is difficult however, to conclude that providing a parent with
absolute power to overrule a determination, made by the healthcare provider and his minor
patient will serve to strengthen the family unit. Neither is it likely that such veto power will
enhance parental authority or control where the minor and the nonconsenting parent are so
fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the
family structure. Any independent interest the parent may have in the termination of the minor
daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of the competent minor mature enough
to have become pregnant.").
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shown that a majority of adolescents voluntarily share information with
their parents after they consult privately with a healthcare provider....
This is predicated not by laws but on the quality of the relationships
within the family. '235 Parents who have worked to foster respectful and
caring relationships with their children will, hopefully, find that an ado-
lescent seeking healthcare advice will turn to his parents for needed ad-
vice and support.
Evaluating the potential conflict between parent and adolescent re-
quires correctly framing the issue, not as one of whether a parent is capa-
ble of discerning and acting upon the best interests of a child. Instead,
the issue is whether a young person is able to discern what is in her own
best interest and act accordingly. Where a qualified actor exists, al-
lowing a third party, no matter how capable, caring, or loving, to wholly
consume the decision-making capacity of the capable actor is a less than
optimal ordering of human relationships. This is true even in the context
of loving parents and sick young people.
Protecting families demands respect for all members of a familial
unit and thus requires providing rights to both parents and their minor
children. If one believes in the inherent dignity of adolescents, then one
must recognize that this dignity is diminished by exclusion of a young
person from conversations and decision-making about her health, thus
depriving her of the opportunity to determine the course of her own life.
With the rights of parents also come duties and responsibilities. A par-
ent's role is to provide direction and guidance as a child learns to ascer-
tain and assert her own interests, wants, and desires. By providing legal
reinforcement for the types of health care decision-making in which
many well-functioning families likely already engage, the law can simul-
taneously protect young people, nurture families, and respect parents.
There are those parents who will view any change in the status of
the right to determine the healthcare choices of their adolescent child as a
substantial and unwarranted deprivation of rights. This same argument
can be made about the existing web of state statutes that presently pro-
vide limited healthcare decision-making rights to adolescents, yet it ap-
pears that these statutes have not been widely challenged. Arguably
there is a subtle, but significant, benefit that accrues to parents from such
statutes. In some cases, these laws may lead a young person to access
necessary healthcare that he would not seek if discussion with a parent
were a prerequisite-a benefit that ultimately accrues to the parent who
wants a safe and healthy child more than she wants a child who asks her
permission before making sure that he is well. Further, allowing young
people to make independent healthcare decisions contributes to their
235 AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, supra note 176.
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ability to think about and act in accordance with their own best interests,
thereby helping them become self-sufficient adults. 2 36
Conceding a natural inequality and necessary dependence between
children and parents does not require that adolescents be completely shut
out of the rights given to their parents. As Barbara Bennett Woodhouse
explains:
Empowering one individual to control another implicates
human rights that attach even to those who are inher-
ently dependent, lacking either the mature capacity or
the practical autonomy to act on their own behalf.
Rights to bodily integrity, to identity, to maintain inti-
mate relationships, and to freedom of faith and thought
do not depend on equality.
237
In most circumstances, parents and their offspring will not be at
odds about appropriate treatment for a young person's illness.2 38 In such
cases, the transfer of a right to knowledge and consent for the young
person will help the patient form an optimal bond with her healthcare
provider and increase the chance for deriving maximum benefit from co-
operating with treatment while showing respect for the family unit and
the interdependence of parent and child. Where there is conflict between
parents and their adolescent children, which will inevitably occur in
some small portion of cases,239 the central question becomes how best to
support whole families, not just parents, and protect the interests of ado-
lescents in the face of such conflicts. This article's proposal allows these
disputes to remain within the family by granting legal protection to the
adolescent's interest in her own bodily autonomy, thereby showing
greater deference and respect for the sanctity of the family than does an
automatic shift to a state-run child protective system.
Devaluing the parental role need not be seen as an inevitable conse-
quence of acknowledging adolescent autonomy. Allowing adolescents to
participate in or direct their own healthcare can lead to an increase in
236 See supra text accompanying notes 201-202.
237 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse; The Dark Side of Familial Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1247, 1255 (June/Aug. 1999).
238 There are those who disagree with this assertion and argue that conflict is much more
common than harmony. One of the healthcare providers who worked for years to get the AAP
to approve a policy on issues of consent and assent in healthcare for children wrote:
I would argue that "identity" or "harmony" between the interests of parents and
those of their children are what is rare. Conflict is the norm. Unfortunately, the very
common difference between the desires and interests of children and those of their
parents are [sic] frequently ignored by both parents and providers.... We do our-
selves and our patients a disservice when we deceive ourselves with this hopelessly
"romantic" view of what goes on in families.
William G. Bartholome, Letter to the Editor, 96 PEDIATRICS 981, 981 (Nov. 1995).
239 Id
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parental perception of an adolescent's social age240 and reinforce lessons
conveyed about responsibility and thoughtfulness. Furthermore, as sug-
gested earlier, it is likely that many, if not most, adolescents will con-
tinue to consult with and make decisions in tandem with their parents.
The difference will be that the adolescents will have greater opportunities
for engaging in mature and thoughtful decision making which will, in
turn, accrue to their benefit as they move toward adulthood.
Certainly, asking that parents share decision-making with their ado-
lescent children,
does not imply that parental involvement is not impor-
tant; parental involvement is a recognized part of the op-
timal health care for adolescents. The pediatrician is not
placing himself in an adversarial position in relation to
the parents when he obtains their adolescent offspring's
consent or when he maintains the confidentiality of what
the adolescent has told him, although the parents may
not always perceive that this is the case. In reality, the
pediatrician shares the same goal that the parents have:
to protect and restore the adolescent health.
24 1
In the end, any perceived loss of parental power is justified if it is a
necessary prerequisite to according an appropriate level of personhood to
adolescents.
CONCLUSION
Above almost all else, we seek a legal policy that pre-
serves the life chances for those who make serious mis-
takes, as well as preserving choices for their more
fortunate. . . contemporaries.
242
No child or adolescent is simply a bystander in her own healthcare,
nor is she just a body to be acted upon. As such, there should always be
ways of involving that young person in decisions about her own care,
with the understanding that the level of involvement may exist on a slid-
ing scale given the individual characteristics of the patient child in-
volved. As one author has written:
240 Social age refers to the ways in which parents' perception of the age and dependency
of their children is impacted by the degree to which those children are granted opportunities
for autonomy that then impact their level of maturity. Anne Solberg, Negotiating Childhood:
Changing Constructions of Age for Norwegian Children, in CONSTRUCTING AND RECON-
STRUCTING CHILDHOOD: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF CHILDHOOD
118, 134 (Alison James & Alan Prout eds., 1990).
241 Silber, supra note 66, at 409.
242 ZIMRING, supra note 193, at 91-92.
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Based on detailed knowledge about the real competence
of children, it should be possible to protect them when
necessary, without overprotecting them. . . . It should
not be forgotten, however, that protection of children is
not a form of discrimination: all people need protection
at some point or other in their lives and in a variety of
difficult situations. Equally, the fact that children are
dependent is not a reason to deny their participation
rights. In the first place, everyone is dependent on other
people at least some of the time, without thereby losing
such rights. In the second place, even when adults are
totally dependent on others, their autonomy can be pro-
vided for, based on their inherent dignity as human be-
ings. Dependent or not, the participation rights of adults
are subject to restrictions, bearing in mind the rights of
others and the needs of the community. The same ap-
plies to children.
243
Presently, the law fails to recognize the body of scientific literature
indicating the ability of young people to make informed decisions about
their own healthcare and the degree to which granting adolescent auton-
omy in this area can improve the relationship between a healthcare pro-
vider and an adolescent patient. Furthermore, current legal regulations
work against a norm of family communication, ignore the reality of the
lives of many families, and gives short shrift to the moral function of law
to the extent that it devalues the moral status of adolescents by denying
their autonomy. To rectify needless imbalance, it is necessary to em-
brace the concept of bodily autonomy for young people by recognizing
their right to be apprised of their own health status, fully informed about
the meaning of that status, offered available treatment options, and
granted the opportunity to meaningfully participate in making an in-
formed decision about treatment.
The way that society regulates youth reflects our values and morals
and helps shape the adults that these young people will become. The
legal system's piecemeal and limited offerings of rights to adolescents
does not succeed in keeping young people safe from themselves and does
not maintain the cohesiveness of families. Too often, the legal system
works against a cooperative healthcare provider-patient relationship and
ignores or devalues the capabilities of young people.
I propose a shift in the legal framework in which youth is not auto-
matically synonymous with a lack of decision-making capacity. Rather,
based on knowledge about the cognitive abilities of adolescents and the
243 Flekkoy, supra note 142, at 75 (citation omitted).
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ethical and professional standards by which healthcare providers try to
provide care to young people, it is appropriate to allow young people to
share decision-making power with their parents and seek out confidential
care when desired and necessary. Making this shift shows tremendous
respect for young people and acknowledges their moral status as autono-
mous human beings. Further, it encourages a model family structure in
which young people engage with their parents about important issues,
but in which parental interest in controlling children does not automati-
cally trump a young person's needs.

